巴基斯坦的硬幣/CT進化：從反應到主動

在9/11和隨後的美國入侵阿富汗之前，硬幣/CT並不是巴基斯坦軍隊的主要重點領域。

Pakistan’s counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) efforts have largely centered around combating militant threats in the country’s border regions, particularly the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

巴基斯坦的平叛（硬幣）和反恐（CT）的努力主要集中在對抗該國邊境地區的激進威脅，特別是聯邦政府部落地區（FATA）。

In the years leading up to the 9/11 attacks and subsequent U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, COIN/CT was not a primary area of focus for the Pakistani military. Aside from sporadic, small-scale operations, each of the tri-services had operated upon the assumption that their main security threat was India.

在9/11襲擊和隨後的美國入侵阿富汗之前的幾年中，硬幣/CT並不是巴基斯坦軍方的主要重點領域。除了零星的小規模行動外，每個三服務都在假設其主要安全威脅是印度的假設之外。

However, following America’s entry into Afghanistan, insurgencies started flaring up in Pakistan’s border regions. These included groups like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI), and Ansar al-Sharia Pakistan (ASSP), among others. Each of these groups sought to establish an Islamic caliphate in Pakistan and overthrow the state.

但是，在美國進入阿富汗之後，叛亂開始在巴基斯坦邊境地區爆發。其中包括Tehreek-e-Taliban巴基斯坦（TTP），Lashkar-e-Islam（Lei）和Ansar al-Sharia Bakistan（ASSP）等團體。這些團體中的每一個都試圖在巴基斯坦建立伊斯蘭哈里發，並推翻國家。

Pakistan’s early campaigns against these threats, such as Operational al-Mizan (2002-2006) and Operation Sherdil (2004-2006), exposed significant gaps in equipment, training, and doctrine. Both campaigns resulted in high levels of civilian casualties and, in turn, led to peace deals with the TTP.

巴基斯坦針對這些威脅的早期運動，例如運營Al-Mizan（2002-2006）和Sherdil行動（2004-2006），在設備，培訓和教義方面佔據了很大的差距。兩項運動都導致了高水平的平民傷亡，進而導致與TTP達成和平交易。

Moreover, the heavy-handed tactics employed by the military led to a sense of alienation among local populations. At the time, Pakistan’s COIN/CT efforts were largely defined by poorly targeted air and artillery strikes.

此外，軍方採用的繁重策略導致當地人口的疏遠感。當時，巴基斯坦的硬幣/CT努力在很大程度上取決於針對性的空氣和砲兵罷工。

However, it was around the mid-2000s that the Pakistan Army (PA) and Pakistan Air Force (PAF) both made COIN/CT a key priority in their respective modernization roadmaps. This shift in focus was largely driven by the TTP’s gains in Pakistan’s Northern Areas.

但是，正是在2000年代中期，巴基斯坦軍隊（PA）和巴基斯坦空軍（PAF）都將硬幣/CT作為其各自的現代化路線圖成為關鍵。這種重點轉變主要是由TTP在巴基斯坦北部地區的收益所驅動的。

By 2009, the PA began implementing small-unit tactics while also providing its infantry with better personal protective gear and small arms. The PAF acquired intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and precision-strike capabilities. Collectively, these changes helped Pakistan’s security forces reverse TTP and other militant gains in the Northern Areas and, in turn, contain the threat to FATA.

到2009年，PA開始實施小單位戰術，同時還為步兵提供了更好的個人防護裝備和小型武器。 PAF獲得了智能，監視和偵察（ISR）資產和精確策略功能。總的來說，這些變化幫助巴基斯坦的安全部隊逆轉了TTP和北部地區的其他激進收益，反過來又包含了對FATA的威脅。

By 2014, Pakistan’s COIN/CT capacity matured to a point where it entered and fought the TTP in the latter’s strongholds in South and North Waziristan. These operations, code-named Zarb-e-Azb and Khyber-I, respectively, largely succeeded in pushing the TTP out of FATA and into Afghanistan.

到2014年，巴基斯坦的硬幣/CT能力成熟到了它進入並在後者在南部和北瓦濟里斯坦的據點中與TTP作戰的地步。這些行動分別為代碼為Zarb-e-Azb和Khyber-I，在很大程度上成功地將TTP推出了FATA並進入阿富汗。

In the years that followed, Pakistan’s COIN/CT capacity helped contain militant threats in the country’s border regions. However, by the late 2010s, Pakistan had hoped that it could move beyond COIN/CT and refocus on conventional threats.

在隨後的幾年中，巴基斯坦的硬幣/CT能力有助於遏制該國邊境地區的激進威脅。但是，到2010年代後期，巴基斯坦希望它可以超越硬幣/CT並重新關注常規威脅。

Indeed, the 2020s saw Pakistan focus on procuring conventional arms, such as new main battle tanks (MBT), advanced fighter aircraft, and warships. This shift in focus was also driven by Pakistan’s desire to deter India along the Line of Control (LOC).

的確，2020年代，巴基斯坦專注於採購常規武器，例如新的主要戰車（MBT），高級戰鬥機和軍艦。這一重點的轉變也是由於巴基斯坦沿著控制線（LOC）阻止印度的願望所驅動的。

However, with COIN/CT resurfacing as a threat once again, the PA and PAF may once again be poised to adjust their respective procurement plans, at least in the short-term.

但是，隨著硬幣/CT再次浮出水面作為威脅，PA和PAF可能會再次準備好調整其各自的採購計劃，至少在短期內。