巴基斯坦的硬币/CT进化：从反应到主动

在9/11和随后的美国入侵阿富汗之前，硬币/CT并不是巴基斯坦军队的主要重点领域。

Pakistan’s counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) efforts have largely centered around combating militant threats in the country’s border regions, particularly the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

巴基斯坦的平叛（硬币）和反恐（CT）的努力主要集中在对抗该国边境地区的激进威胁，特别是联邦政府部落地区（FATA）。

In the years leading up to the 9/11 attacks and subsequent U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, COIN/CT was not a primary area of focus for the Pakistani military. Aside from sporadic, small-scale operations, each of the tri-services had operated upon the assumption that their main security threat was India.

在9/11袭击和随后的美国入侵阿富汗之前的几年中，硬币/CT并不是巴基斯坦军方的主要重点领域。除了零星的小规模行动外，每个三服务都在假设其主要安全威胁是印度的假设之外。

However, following America’s entry into Afghanistan, insurgencies started flaring up in Pakistan’s border regions. These included groups like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI), and Ansar al-Sharia Pakistan (ASSP), among others. Each of these groups sought to establish an Islamic caliphate in Pakistan and overthrow the state.

但是，在美国进入阿富汗之后，叛乱开始在巴基斯坦边境地区爆发。其中包括Tehreek-e-Taliban巴基斯坦（TTP），Lashkar-e-Islam（Lei）和Ansar al-Sharia Bakistan（ASSP）等团体。这些团体中的每一个都试图在巴基斯坦建立伊斯兰哈里发，并推翻国家。

Pakistan’s early campaigns against these threats, such as Operational al-Mizan (2002-2006) and Operation Sherdil (2004-2006), exposed significant gaps in equipment, training, and doctrine. Both campaigns resulted in high levels of civilian casualties and, in turn, led to peace deals with the TTP.

巴基斯坦针对这些威胁的早期运动，例如运营Al-Mizan（2002-2006）和Sherdil行动（2004-2006），在设备，培训和教义方面占据了很大的差距。两项运动都导致了高水平的平民伤亡，进而导致与TTP达成和平交易。

Moreover, the heavy-handed tactics employed by the military led to a sense of alienation among local populations. At the time, Pakistan’s COIN/CT efforts were largely defined by poorly targeted air and artillery strikes.

此外，军方采用的繁重策略导致当地人口的疏远感。当时，巴基斯坦的硬币/CT努力在很大程度上取决于针对性的空气和炮兵罢工。

However, it was around the mid-2000s that the Pakistan Army (PA) and Pakistan Air Force (PAF) both made COIN/CT a key priority in their respective modernization roadmaps. This shift in focus was largely driven by the TTP’s gains in Pakistan’s Northern Areas.

但是，正是在2000年代中期，巴基斯坦军队（PA）和巴基斯坦空军（PAF）都将硬币/CT作为其各自的现代化路线图成为关键。这种重点转变主要是由TTP在巴基斯坦北部地区的收益所驱动的。

By 2009, the PA began implementing small-unit tactics while also providing its infantry with better personal protective gear and small arms. The PAF acquired intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and precision-strike capabilities. Collectively, these changes helped Pakistan’s security forces reverse TTP and other militant gains in the Northern Areas and, in turn, contain the threat to FATA.

到2009年，PA开始实施小单位战术，同时还为步兵提供了更好的个人防护装备和小型武器。 PAF获得了智能，监视和侦察（ISR）资产和精确策略功能。总的来说，这些变化帮助巴基斯坦的安全部队逆转了TTP和北部地区的其他激进收益，反过来又包含了对FATA的威胁。

By 2014, Pakistan’s COIN/CT capacity matured to a point where it entered and fought the TTP in the latter’s strongholds in South and North Waziristan. These operations, code-named Zarb-e-Azb and Khyber-I, respectively, largely succeeded in pushing the TTP out of FATA and into Afghanistan.

到2014年，巴基斯坦的硬币/CT能力成熟到了它进入并在后者在南部和北瓦济里斯坦的据点中与TTP作战的地步。这些行动分别为代码为Zarb-e-Azb和Khyber-I，在很大程度上成功地将TTP推出了FATA并进入阿富汗。

In the years that followed, Pakistan’s COIN/CT capacity helped contain militant threats in the country’s border regions. However, by the late 2010s, Pakistan had hoped that it could move beyond COIN/CT and refocus on conventional threats.

在随后的几年中，巴基斯坦的硬币/CT能力有助于遏制该国边境地区的激进威胁。但是，到2010年代后期，巴基斯坦希望它可以超越硬币/CT并重新关注常规威胁。

Indeed, the 2020s saw Pakistan focus on procuring conventional arms, such as new main battle tanks (MBT), advanced fighter aircraft, and warships. This shift in focus was also driven by Pakistan’s desire to deter India along the Line of Control (LOC).

的确，2020年代，巴基斯坦专注于采购常规武器，例如新的主要战车（MBT），高级战斗机和军舰。这一重点的转变也是由于巴基斯坦沿着控制线（LOC）阻止印度的愿望所驱动的。

However, with COIN/CT resurfacing as a threat once again, the PA and PAF may once again be poised to adjust their respective procurement plans, at least in the short-term.

但是，随着硬币/CT再次浮出水面作为威胁，PA和PAF可能会再次准备好调整其各自的采购计划，至少在短期内。