巴基斯坦的平叛战略：过去的错误和未来选择

几十年来，巴基斯坦的硬币策略一直依赖于过时的，较重的方法 - 高强度的军事行动，迅速的战术胜利和短暂的稳定时刻

For decades, Pakistan's counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy has relied on an outdated, force-heavy approach— high-intensity military operations, swift tactical victories, and brief moments of stability, only for insurgencies to resurface with greater adaptability. This cycle of violence, a damning indictment of a flawed playbook, exposes the limitations of relying solely on kinetic force while neglecting the socio-political realities that sustain militancy.

几十年来，巴基斯坦的平叛（硬币）战略一直依赖于过时的，过时的力量方法 - 高强度的军事行动，迅速的战术胜利和短暂的稳定时刻，仅仅是为了使叛乱与更大的适应能力重新外观。这种暴力周期是对有缺陷的剧本的一个令人发指的起诉，暴露了仅依靠动力学力量的局限性，同时忽略了维持武装的社会政治现实。

While battlefield successes may suppress threats momentarily, they fail to address the root causes of insurgency, ensuring that extremist networks remain resilient, ready to exploit state missteps and return with renewed force. The same fundamental errors persist— overlooking grassroots intelligence networks, sidelining indigenous populations, and ignoring the grievances that allow militant narratives to take hold.

尽管战场的成功可能会瞬间抑制威胁，但他们无法解决叛乱的根本原因，以确保极端主义网络保持韧性，准备利用国家失误并以更新的力量返回。同样的根本错误仍然存​​在 - 俯瞰基层情报网络，旁观者的土著人口，而忽略了使武装叙事能够占据的不满。

The pattern is unmistakable. From the tribal districts to Balochistan, every phase of insurgency has revealed the inadequacy of an approach that prioritizes military solutions over a holistic COIN framework. Pakistan's security establishment has yet to internalize a critical lesson: counterinsurgency is not won through firepower alone but through a multi-pronged strategy that combines intelligence-driven operations, political engagement, economic empowerment, and social integration.

该模式是明确的。从部落地区到Bal路支省，叛乱的每个阶段都揭示了一种方法不足，该方法优先考虑军事解决方案，而不是整体硬币框架。巴基斯坦的安全机构尚未将关键的教训内化：不仅是通过火力来赢得平叛，而是通过将情报驱动的行动，政治参与，授权和社会融合结合起来的多管齐下战略。

Global case studies— from the U.S. failures in Afghanistan to the Sri Lankan military’s mixed success against the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam— prove that sustainable peace is only possible when states address the underlying conditions that fuel rebellion. If Pakistan fails to recalibrate its strategy, it risks becoming trapped in a perpetual war— fighting the same enemies, using the same ineffective tactics, expecting different results.

全球案例研究 - 从美国在阿富汗的失败到斯里兰卡军方对泰米尔泰米尔泰格族的泰米尔猛虎组织的多种成功，证明只有在国家解决助长叛乱的潜在条件时，可持续和平才有可能。如果巴基斯坦未能重新校准其策略，它可能会陷入永久战争中 - 使用相同的无效策略与同一敌人作斗争，并期望产生不同的结果。

The resurgence of terrorism is not an anomaly; it is the inevitable outcome of Pakistan's short-sighted COIN strategy, which continues to prioritize military might over comprehensive counterinsurgency principles. Insurgencies do not thrive in a vacuum— they are fed by political exclusion, economic despair, and the absence of state legitimacy. Military campaigns may kill insurgents, but they do not kill insurgencies. Without addressing the systemic injustices that drive people into the arms of militant groups, every so-called “victory” remains an illusion— a temporary pause before the next insurgent wave. Pakistan must abandon its fixation on body counts and adopt a strategy centered on dismantling militant ecosystems at their very roots.

恐怖主义的复兴不是异常。这是巴基斯坦短视硬币战略的必然结果，该战略继续优先考虑军队的优先级，而不是全面的平叛原则。叛乱没有在真空中蓬勃发展 - 他们是由于政治排斥，经济绝望和缺乏国家合法性而喂养的。军事运动可能会杀死叛乱分子，但不会杀死叛乱。没有解决将人们进入激进组织的武器的系统性不公正，每个所谓的“胜利”仍然是一种幻想，这是一个暂时的停顿，在下一次叛乱浪潮之前。巴基斯坦必须放弃其对人体数量的固定，并采用以拆除激进生态系统为中心的策略。

A fundamental shift is imperative. A counterinsurgency strategy that does not integrate the people as allies is destined to fail. If Pakistan wishes to break free from the shackles of perpetual conflict, it must rewrite its COIN playbook— into one that prioritizes not just the defeat of militants, but the reclamation of hearts and minds.

必须进行基本转变。一项不整合人民的平叛策略，因为盟友注定要失败。如果巴基斯坦希望摆脱永久冲突的束缚，它必须重写其硬币剧本 - 不仅将武装分子失败，还优先考虑一本优先考虑的剧本，而且还优先考虑对心灵和思想的填补。

Counterinsurgency, by definition, is not just about eliminating insurgents; it is about winning over populations, dismantling support networks, and ensuring long-term stability. Modern COIN strategies have evolved from colonial-era doctrines that combined military suppression with efforts to win “hearts and minds.” The British in Northern Ireland, the Philippines against the Moro insurgents, and even American campaigns in Iraq and Vietnam have demonstrated that insurgencies are not purely military conflicts but socio-political struggles demanding multifaceted responses. Yet, Pakistan’s strategy remains disproportionately tilted toward kinetic operations, failing to incorporate crucial political, economic, and psychological dimensions.

从定义上讲，平叛不仅仅是消除叛乱分子；这是关于赢得人口，拆除支持网络并确保长期稳定的胜利。现代硬币策略是由殖民时代的教义演变而来的，这些教义将军事压制与赢得“心灵”的努力相结合。北爱尔兰的英国人，菲律宾针对摩洛叛乱分子的菲律宾，甚至在伊拉克和越南的美国竞选活动都表明，叛乱不是纯粹是军事冲突，而是社会政治斗争，要求需要多方面的反应。然而，巴基斯坦的战略仍然不成比例地倾向于动力学行动，未能纳入关键的政治，经济和心理方面。

The British success in Malaya against communist insurgents in the 1950s provides a striking contrast to Pakistan’s flawed approach. Instead of relying solely on brute force, the British combined military operations with political reforms, economic incentives, and local empowerment, thereby cutting off the insurgents’ support base. The Malayan Emergency was won not through indiscriminate bombings or mass arrests but by creating conditions that made insurgency an unattractive option. In contrast, Pakistan’s counterinsurgency campaigns, whether in Swat, North Waziristan, or Balochistan, have rarely been followed by meaningful political engagement or economic rejuvenation. The absence of a post-conflict rehabilitation plan means that areas cleared of militants remain vulnerable to re-infiltration, turning every military success into a transient, illusory achievement.

1950年代，英国在马来亚对共产党叛乱分子的成功与巴基斯坦的有缺陷的方法形成了鲜明的对比。英国不仅依靠蛮力，而是将军事行动与政治改革，经济激励措施和当地赋权相结合，从而切断了叛乱分子的支持基础。马来亚紧急情况不是通过不加区分的爆炸或大规模逮捕而赢得的，而是通过创造使叛乱成为无吸引力的选择的条件。相比之下，无论是在特警，北瓦兹里斯坦还是Bal路支省，巴基斯坦的平叛运动都很少受到有意义的政治参与或经济复兴。缺乏冲突后的康复计划意味着，清除武装分子的地区仍然容易被重新灌输，将所有军事成功都变成了短暂的，虚幻的成就。

Successive military operations— Zarb-e-Azb, Radd-ul-Fasaad, and now Azm-e-Istehkam— have undoubtedly eliminated key militant strongholds and disrupted terror networks. However, long-term peace remains elusive. The recent hijacking of the Jaffar Express in Balochistan, which claimed the lives of 21 hostages and four security personnel, is a chilling reminder that insurgents are far from being defeated. Their ability to carry out such high-profile attacks exposes a fundamental flaw in Pakistan’s approach: the state has been fighting symptoms while ignoring the disease. The persistent unrest in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan raises an uncomfortable question— has Pakistan learned anything from its past failures, or is it merely recycling the same ineffective tactics under different names?

连续的军事行动 - Zarb-e-azb，Radd-ul-Fasaad和现在的AZM-E-ISTEHKAM-无疑消除了重要的激进据点和破坏的恐怖网络。但是，长期和平仍然难以捉摸。最近在Bal路支省劫持了Jaffar Express的劫持，该贾法尔（Jaffar Express）夺走了21名人质和4名安全人员的生命，这是一个令人震惊的提醒，叛乱分子远未被击败。他们进行此类备受瞩目的攻击的能力揭示了巴基斯坦方法中的基本缺陷：该州一直在忽略这种疾病的同时应对症状。开伯尔·普赫图赫瓦（Khyber Pakhtunkhwa）和巴洛奇斯坦（Balochistan）的持续动荡提出了一个不舒服的问题 - 巴基斯坦是否从过去的失败中学到了任何东西，还是只是以不同的名义回收了相同的无效策略？

The choice before Pakistan is stark and unforgiving: persist with a failing strategy that breeds more conflict or adopt a new path grounded in inclusivity, justice, and political reconciliation. Anything short of this is a betrayal of the sacrifices made, a failure of leadership, and a guarantee that today’s

巴基斯坦面前的选择是鲜明而宽容的：坚持不懈地战略，造成更多冲突或采用以包容性，正义和政治和解为基础的新途径。除此之外