巴基斯坦的平叛戰略：過去的錯誤和未來選擇

幾十年來，巴基斯坦的硬幣策略一直依賴於過時的，較重的方法 - 高強度的軍事行動，迅速的戰術勝利和短暫的穩定時刻

For decades, Pakistan's counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy has relied on an outdated, force-heavy approach— high-intensity military operations, swift tactical victories, and brief moments of stability, only for insurgencies to resurface with greater adaptability. This cycle of violence, a damning indictment of a flawed playbook, exposes the limitations of relying solely on kinetic force while neglecting the socio-political realities that sustain militancy.

幾十年來，巴基斯坦的平叛（硬幣）戰略一直依賴於過時的，過時的力量方法 - 高強度的軍事行動，迅速的戰術勝利和短暫的穩定時刻，僅僅是為了使叛亂與更大的適應能力重新外觀。這種暴力週期是對有缺陷的劇本的一個令人髮指的起訴，暴露了僅依靠動力學力量的局限性，同時忽略了維持武裝的社會政治現實。

While battlefield successes may suppress threats momentarily, they fail to address the root causes of insurgency, ensuring that extremist networks remain resilient, ready to exploit state missteps and return with renewed force. The same fundamental errors persist— overlooking grassroots intelligence networks, sidelining indigenous populations, and ignoring the grievances that allow militant narratives to take hold.

儘管戰場的成功可能會瞬間抑制威脅，但他們無法解決叛亂的根本原因，以確保極端主義網絡保持韌性，準備利用國家失誤並以更新的力量返回。同樣的根本錯誤仍然存​​在 - 俯瞰基層情報網絡，旁觀者的土著人口，而忽略了使武裝敘事能夠佔據的不滿。

The pattern is unmistakable. From the tribal districts to Balochistan, every phase of insurgency has revealed the inadequacy of an approach that prioritizes military solutions over a holistic COIN framework. Pakistan's security establishment has yet to internalize a critical lesson: counterinsurgency is not won through firepower alone but through a multi-pronged strategy that combines intelligence-driven operations, political engagement, economic empowerment, and social integration.

該模式是明確的。從部落地區到Bal路支省，叛亂的每個階段都揭示了一種方法不足，該方法優先考慮軍事解決方案，而不是整體硬幣框架。巴基斯坦的安全機構尚未將關鍵的教訓內化：不僅是通過火力來贏得平叛，而是通過將情報驅動的行動，政治參與，授權和社會融合結合起來的多管齊下戰略。

Global case studies— from the U.S. failures in Afghanistan to the Sri Lankan military’s mixed success against the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam— prove that sustainable peace is only possible when states address the underlying conditions that fuel rebellion. If Pakistan fails to recalibrate its strategy, it risks becoming trapped in a perpetual war— fighting the same enemies, using the same ineffective tactics, expecting different results.

全球案例研究 - 從美國在阿富汗的失敗到斯里蘭卡軍方對泰米爾泰米爾泰格族的泰米爾猛虎組織的多種成功，證明只有在國家解決助長叛亂的潛在條件時，可持續和平才有可能。如果巴基斯坦未能重新校准其策略，它可能會陷入永久戰爭中 - 使用相同的無效策略與同一敵人作鬥爭，並期望產生不同的結果。

The resurgence of terrorism is not an anomaly; it is the inevitable outcome of Pakistan's short-sighted COIN strategy, which continues to prioritize military might over comprehensive counterinsurgency principles. Insurgencies do not thrive in a vacuum— they are fed by political exclusion, economic despair, and the absence of state legitimacy. Military campaigns may kill insurgents, but they do not kill insurgencies. Without addressing the systemic injustices that drive people into the arms of militant groups, every so-called “victory” remains an illusion— a temporary pause before the next insurgent wave. Pakistan must abandon its fixation on body counts and adopt a strategy centered on dismantling militant ecosystems at their very roots.

恐怖主義的複興不是異常。這是巴基斯坦短視硬幣戰略的必然結果，該戰略繼續優先考慮軍隊的優先級，而不是全面的平叛原則。叛亂沒有在真空中蓬勃發展 - 他們是由於政治排斥，經濟絕望和缺乏國家合法性而餵養的。軍事運動可能會殺死叛亂分子，但不會殺死叛亂。沒有解決將人們進入激進組織的武器的系統性不公正，每個所謂的“勝利”仍然是一種幻想，這是一個暫時的停頓，在下一次叛亂浪潮之前。巴基斯坦必須放棄其對人體數量的固定，並採用以拆除激進生態系統為中心的策略。

A fundamental shift is imperative. A counterinsurgency strategy that does not integrate the people as allies is destined to fail. If Pakistan wishes to break free from the shackles of perpetual conflict, it must rewrite its COIN playbook— into one that prioritizes not just the defeat of militants, but the reclamation of hearts and minds.

必須進行基本轉變。一項不整合人民的平叛策略，因為盟友注定要失敗。如果巴基斯坦希望擺脫永久衝突的束縛，它必須重寫其硬幣劇本 - 不僅將武裝分子失敗，還優先考慮一本優先考慮的劇本，而且還優先考慮對心靈和思想的填補。

Counterinsurgency, by definition, is not just about eliminating insurgents; it is about winning over populations, dismantling support networks, and ensuring long-term stability. Modern COIN strategies have evolved from colonial-era doctrines that combined military suppression with efforts to win “hearts and minds.” The British in Northern Ireland, the Philippines against the Moro insurgents, and even American campaigns in Iraq and Vietnam have demonstrated that insurgencies are not purely military conflicts but socio-political struggles demanding multifaceted responses. Yet, Pakistan’s strategy remains disproportionately tilted toward kinetic operations, failing to incorporate crucial political, economic, and psychological dimensions.

從定義上講，平叛不僅僅是消除叛亂分子；這是關於贏得人口，拆除支持網絡並確保長期穩定的勝利。現代硬幣策略是由殖民時代的教義演變而來的，這些教義將軍事壓制與贏得“心靈”的努力相結合。北愛爾蘭的英國人，菲律賓針對摩洛叛亂分子的菲律賓，甚至在伊拉克和越南的美國競選活動都表明，叛亂不是純粹是軍事衝突，而是社會政治鬥爭，要求需要多方面的反應。然而，巴基斯坦的戰略仍然不成比例地傾向於動力學行動，未能納入關鍵的政治，經濟和心理方面。

The British success in Malaya against communist insurgents in the 1950s provides a striking contrast to Pakistan’s flawed approach. Instead of relying solely on brute force, the British combined military operations with political reforms, economic incentives, and local empowerment, thereby cutting off the insurgents’ support base. The Malayan Emergency was won not through indiscriminate bombings or mass arrests but by creating conditions that made insurgency an unattractive option. In contrast, Pakistan’s counterinsurgency campaigns, whether in Swat, North Waziristan, or Balochistan, have rarely been followed by meaningful political engagement or economic rejuvenation. The absence of a post-conflict rehabilitation plan means that areas cleared of militants remain vulnerable to re-infiltration, turning every military success into a transient, illusory achievement.

1950年代，英國在馬來亞對共產黨叛亂分子的成功與巴基斯坦的有缺陷的方法形成了鮮明的對比。英國不僅依靠蠻力，而是將軍事行動與政治改革，經濟激勵措施和當地賦權相結合，從而切斷了叛亂分子的支持基礎。馬來亞緊急情況不是通過不加區分的爆炸或大規模逮捕而贏得的，而是通過創造使叛亂成為無吸引力的選擇的條件。相比之下，無論是在特警，北瓦茲里斯坦還是Bal路支省，巴基斯坦的平叛運動都很少受到有意義的政治參與或經濟復興。缺乏衝突後的康復計劃意味著，清除武裝分子的地區仍然容易被重新灌輸，將所有軍事成功都變成了短暫的，虛幻的成就。

Successive military operations— Zarb-e-Azb, Radd-ul-Fasaad, and now Azm-e-Istehkam— have undoubtedly eliminated key militant strongholds and disrupted terror networks. However, long-term peace remains elusive. The recent hijacking of the Jaffar Express in Balochistan, which claimed the lives of 21 hostages and four security personnel, is a chilling reminder that insurgents are far from being defeated. Their ability to carry out such high-profile attacks exposes a fundamental flaw in Pakistan’s approach: the state has been fighting symptoms while ignoring the disease. The persistent unrest in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan raises an uncomfortable question— has Pakistan learned anything from its past failures, or is it merely recycling the same ineffective tactics under different names?

連續的軍事行動 - Zarb-e-azb，Radd-ul-Fasaad和現在的AZM-E-ISTEHKAM-無疑消除了重要的激進據點和破壞的恐怖網絡。但是，長期和平仍然難以捉摸。最近在Bal路支省劫持了Jaffar Express的劫持，該賈法爾（Jaffar Express）奪走了21名人質和4名安全人員的生命，這是一個令人震驚的提醒，叛亂分子遠未被擊敗。他們進行此類備受矚目的攻擊的能力揭示了巴基斯坦方法中的基本缺陷：該州一直在忽略這種疾病的同時應對症狀。開伯爾·普赫圖赫瓦（Khyber Pakhtunkhwa）和巴洛奇斯坦（Balochistan）的持續動盪提出了一個不舒服的問題 - 巴基斯坦是否從過去的失敗中學到了任何東西，還是只是以不同的名義回收了相同的無效策略？

The choice before Pakistan is stark and unforgiving: persist with a failing strategy that breeds more conflict or adopt a new path grounded in inclusivity, justice, and political reconciliation. Anything short of this is a betrayal of the sacrifices made, a failure of leadership, and a guarantee that today’s

巴基斯坦面前的選擇是鮮明而寬容的：堅持不懈地戰略，造成更多衝突或採用以包容性，正義和政治和解為基礎的新途徑。除此之外