代幣經濟學的危險：模型為何失敗以及未來的教訓

代幣經濟學通常被譽為推動區塊鏈專案成功的引擎。透過設計與使用者保持一致的激勵措施和結構

Tokenomics is often touted as the driving force behind successful blockchain projects. By aligning incentives and creating structures that benefit users, developers, and investors, tokenomics can be a powerful tool for growth and sustainability. However, as evidenced by the spectacular crashes of several cryptocurrency projects, not all tokenomics models are created equal.

代幣經濟學經常被譽為成功區塊鏈專案背後的驅動力。透過調整激勵措施並創建有利於用戶、開發人員和投資者的結構，代幣經濟學可以成為促進成長和永續發展的強大工具。然而，正如幾個加密貨幣項目的驚人崩潰所證明的那樣，並非所有代幣經濟學模型都是平等的。

From unsustainable incentives to liquidity crises, the failure of certain projects offers valuable lessons on what not to do. In this article, we'll delve into the key reasons why tokenomics models fail and explore how future projects can learn from these mistakes.

從不可持續的激勵措施到流動性危機，某些計畫的失敗為我們提供了寶貴的教訓，告訴我們哪些事情不該做。在本文中，我們將深入探討通證經濟模型失敗的關鍵原因，並探討未來的專案如何從這些錯誤中學習。

The Perils of Unsustainable Incentives One of the most glaring causes of tokenomics failures is the use of unsustainable incentive structures. Early crypto projects often enticed participants with sky-high rewards for staking, mining, or providing liquidity, but these rewards came at a steep cost.

不可持續激勵的危險 代幣經濟學失敗的最明顯原因之一是使用不可持續的激勵結構。早期的加密項目通常會透過質押、挖礦或提供流動性的高額獎勵來吸引參與者，但這些獎勵的成本高昂。

Take the example of Terra's UST and LUNA collapse in 2022. The system promised outsized returns through its Anchor Protocol, which offered a near-20% yield on stablecoin deposits. This led to an unsustainable influx of capital, and when market sentiment shifted, the entire ecosystem unraveled.

以 2022 年 Terra 的 UST 和 LUNA 崩潰為例。這導致了不可持續的資本湧入，當市場情緒改變時，整個生態系統就會崩潰。

Investors panicked as UST de-pegged from the dollar, triggering a death spiral that wiped out tens of billions in value. The problem here wasn't just the algorithmic nature of Terra's stablecoin—it was the fact that the tokenomics relied on constant growth to sustain rewards.

隨著 UST 與美元脫鉤，投資者陷入恐慌，引發了死亡螺旋，導致數百億美元的價值蒸發。這裡的問題不僅僅是 Terra 穩定幣的演算法性質，而是代幣經濟依賴持續成長來維持獎勵的事實。

When the market couldn't meet those growth expectations, the incentive structure turned toxic. The lesson is clear: tokenomics models that hinge on unsustainable returns inevitably fail. Sustainable projects need to offer incentives that scale with real economic activity, not speculative mania.

當市場無法滿足這些成長預期時，激勵結構就會變得有毒。教訓很明確：依賴不可持續回報的代幣經濟模型不可避免地會失敗。永續項目需要提供與實際經濟活動相適應的激勵措施，而不是投機狂熱。

Liquidity Black Holes Liquidity is the lifeblood of any token economy. Without sufficient liquidity, users can't easily buy or sell tokens, and prices become volatile. In some cases, tokenomics models have exacerbated liquidity issues by locking up too much of a project's supply in staking or vesting schedules, creating what I call "liquidity black holes."

流動性黑洞 流動性是任何代幣經濟的命脈。如果沒有足夠的流動性，用戶就無法輕易買賣代幣，價格就會變得不穩定。在某些情況下，代幣經濟模型透過將專案的過多供應鎖定在質押或兌現計劃中，加劇了流動性問題，從而形成了我所說的「流動性黑洞」。

One of the more notorious examples of this phenomenon is the Iron Finance collapse, which brought down prominent investor Mark Cuban. Iron Finance's partially collateralized stablecoin lost its peg when large withdrawals drained liquidity.

這種現象最臭名昭著的例子之一是 Iron Finance 的崩潰，它導致了著名投資者 Mark Cuban 的倒閉。當大量提款耗盡流動性時，Iron Finance 的部分抵押穩定幣失去了掛鉤。

The system's design forced it to mint more tokens to maintain the peg, flooding the market with supply and causing prices to plummet. What made this worse was that much of the project's token supply was locked in various protocols, preventing a healthy, liquid market response.

該系統的設計迫使它鑄造更多代幣來維持錨定匯率，導致市場供應氾濫，導致價格暴跌。更糟糕的是，該項目的大部分代幣供應被鎖定在各種協議中，阻礙了健康、流動性的市場反應。

Tokenomics models must carefully balance token lockups with sufficient liquidity. While locking tokens can incentivize holding and stability, too much lockup can lead to illiquid markets, especially during periods of stress. Projects should aim for models that encourage liquidity provision, rather than restricting it.

代幣經濟學模型必須仔細平衡代幣鎖定與充足的流動性。雖然鎖定代幣可以激勵持有和穩定，但過多的鎖定可能會導致市場流動性不足，尤其是在壓力時期。計畫的目標應該是鼓勵而非限制流動性供應的模式。

The Speculation Trap One of the most pervasive issues in failed tokenomics models is over-reliance on speculation. While speculation is a natural part of any market, tokenomics should be designed to reduce excessive speculation rather than fuel it.

投機陷阱 失敗的代幣經濟模型中最普遍的問題之一是過度依賴投機。雖然投機是任何市場的自然組成部分，但代幣經濟學的設計應旨在減少過度投機而不是助長投機。

Projects like BitConnect, a Ponzi scheme disguised as a cryptocurrency, were entirely built on speculation, promising users guaranteed returns through a "trading bot" that never existed. By the time regulators shut down BitConnect in 2018, billions of dollars had vanished.

像 BitConnect 這樣的項目，一種偽裝成加密貨幣的龐氏騙局，完全建立在投機之上，承諾用戶透過從未存在的「交易機器人」來保證回報。當監管機構於 2018 年關閉 BitConnect 時，數十億美元已經消失。

The problem here was that BitConnect's tokenomics were designed not to create real value, but to feed speculative fervor. The project's high returns attracted massive investments, but there was no underlying economic activity to back those returns.

這裡的問題是 BitConnect 的代幣經濟設計不是為了創造真正的價值，而是為了滿​​足投機熱情。該項目的高回報吸引了大量投資，但沒有基礎經濟活動來支持這些回報。

This "pump-and-dump" mentality is something we've seen in several other projects, from OneCoin to the short-lived hype around SafeMoon.

我們在其他幾個項目中也看到了這種「拉高拋售」的心態，從 OneCoin 到圍繞 SafeMoon 的短暫炒作。

To avoid the speculation trap, projects need to ensure that their tokenomics models are tied to actual utility and value creation, not just speculative price movements. Tokens should have clear use cases within the ecosystem—whether for governance, access to services, or payments—rather than existing solely as instruments for speculation.

為了避免投機陷阱，專案需要確保其代幣經濟模型與實際效用和價值創造掛鉤，而不僅僅是投機價格變動。代幣應該在生態系統內有明確的用例——無論是用於治理、服務存取還是支付——而不是僅僅作為投機工具而存在。

Over-Reliance on Algorithmic Stability Algorithmic stablecoins have long been an area of innovation, but they've also been a source of significant failure.

過度依賴演算法穩定性演算法穩定幣長期以來一直是個創新領域，但它們也是重大失敗的根源。

Projects like Basis, which shut down in 2018, and Terra's UST in 2022, both attempted to create algorithmic mechanisms to maintain stability without sufficient collateral backing. The idea was that the protocol itself could adjust supply and demand to maintain a stable price.

Basis 於 2018 年關閉，Terra 的 UST 於 2022 年關閉，它們都試圖創建演算法機制​​來在沒有足夠抵押支持的情況下保持穩定性。這個想法是協議本身可以調整供需以維持穩定的價格。

However, these models often fail because they rely too heavily on market confidence and the assumption that demand for the token will remain high enough to support the algorithm. When confidence erodes, these systems are vulnerable to runs, as we saw with UST.

然而，這些模型經常失敗，因為它們過度依賴市場信心以及對代幣的需求將保持足夠高以支持演算法的假設。當信心減弱時，這些系統很容易出現擠兌，正如我們在 UST 中看到的那樣。

Once the peg breaks, it becomes nearly impossible to restore, as the system floods the market with supply, driving down the token's value further.

一旦掛鉤被打破，就幾乎不可能恢復，因為系統會向市場供應大量供應，進一步壓低代幣的價值。

The lesson here is that algorithmic stability models are inherently fragile without sufficient collateral or external support mechanisms. While some projects, like MakerDAO's DAI, have successfully incorporated

這裡的教訓是，如果沒有足夠的抵押品或外部支援機制，演算法穩定性模型本質上是脆弱的。雖然有些項目，例如 MakerDAO 的 DAI，已經成功地將