代币经济学的危险：模型为何失败以及未来的教训

代币经济学通常被誉为推动区块链项目成功的引擎。通过设计与用户保持一致的激励措施和结构

Tokenomics is often touted as the driving force behind successful blockchain projects. By aligning incentives and creating structures that benefit users, developers, and investors, tokenomics can be a powerful tool for growth and sustainability. However, as evidenced by the spectacular crashes of several cryptocurrency projects, not all tokenomics models are created equal.

代币经济学经常被誉为成功区块链项目背后的驱动力。通过调整激励措施并创建有利于用户、开发者和投资者的结构，代币经济学可以成为促进增长和可持续发展的强大工具。然而，正如几个加密货币项目的惊人崩溃所证明的那样，并非所有代币经济学模型都是平等的。

From unsustainable incentives to liquidity crises, the failure of certain projects offers valuable lessons on what not to do. In this article, we'll delve into the key reasons why tokenomics models fail and explore how future projects can learn from these mistakes.

从不可持续的激励措施到流动性危机，某些项目的失败为我们提供了宝贵的教训，告诉我们哪些事情不该做。在本文中，我们将深入探讨通证经济模型失败的关键原因，并探讨未来的项目如何从这些错误中吸取教训。

The Perils of Unsustainable Incentives One of the most glaring causes of tokenomics failures is the use of unsustainable incentive structures. Early crypto projects often enticed participants with sky-high rewards for staking, mining, or providing liquidity, but these rewards came at a steep cost.

不可持续激励的危险 代币经济学失败的最明显原因之一是使用不可持续的激励结构。早期的加密项目通常会通过质押、挖矿或提供流动性的高额奖励来吸引参与者，但这些奖励的成本高昂。

Take the example of Terra's UST and LUNA collapse in 2022. The system promised outsized returns through its Anchor Protocol, which offered a near-20% yield on stablecoin deposits. This led to an unsustainable influx of capital, and when market sentiment shifted, the entire ecosystem unraveled.

以 2022 年 Terra 的 UST 和 LUNA 崩溃为例。该系统通过其 Anchor Protocol 承诺提供巨额回报，该协议为稳定币存款提供了近 20% 的收益率。这导致了不可持续的资本涌入，当市场情绪发生变化时，整个生态系统就会崩溃。

Investors panicked as UST de-pegged from the dollar, triggering a death spiral that wiped out tens of billions in value. The problem here wasn't just the algorithmic nature of Terra's stablecoin—it was the fact that the tokenomics relied on constant growth to sustain rewards.

随着 UST 与美元脱钩，投资者陷入恐慌，引发了死亡螺旋，导致数百亿美元的价值蒸发。这里的问题不仅仅是 Terra 稳定币的算法性质，而是代币经济依赖持续增长来维持奖励的事实。

When the market couldn't meet those growth expectations, the incentive structure turned toxic. The lesson is clear: tokenomics models that hinge on unsustainable returns inevitably fail. Sustainable projects need to offer incentives that scale with real economic activity, not speculative mania.

当市场无法满足这些增长预期时，激励结构就会变得有毒。教训很明确：依赖于不可持续回报的代币经济模型不可避免地会失败。可持续项目需要提供与实际经济活动相适应的激励措施，而不是投机狂热。

Liquidity Black Holes Liquidity is the lifeblood of any token economy. Without sufficient liquidity, users can't easily buy or sell tokens, and prices become volatile. In some cases, tokenomics models have exacerbated liquidity issues by locking up too much of a project's supply in staking or vesting schedules, creating what I call "liquidity black holes."

流动性黑洞 流动性是任何代币经济的命脉。如果没有足够的流动性，用户就无法轻松买卖代币，价格就会变得不稳定。在某些情况下，代币经济学模型通过将项目的过多供应锁定在质押或兑现计划中，从而加剧了流动性问题，从而形成了我所说的“流动性黑洞”。

One of the more notorious examples of this phenomenon is the Iron Finance collapse, which brought down prominent investor Mark Cuban. Iron Finance's partially collateralized stablecoin lost its peg when large withdrawals drained liquidity.

这种现象最臭名昭著的例子之一是 Iron Finance 的崩溃，它导致了著名投资者马克·库班 (Mark Cuban) 的倒闭。当大量提款耗尽流动性时，Iron Finance 的部分抵押稳定币失去了挂钩。

The system's design forced it to mint more tokens to maintain the peg, flooding the market with supply and causing prices to plummet. What made this worse was that much of the project's token supply was locked in various protocols, preventing a healthy, liquid market response.

该系统的设计迫使它铸造更多代币来维持锚定汇率，从而导致市场供应泛滥，导致价格暴跌。更糟糕的是，该项目的大部分代币供应被锁定在各种协议中，从而阻碍了健康、流动性的市场反应。

Tokenomics models must carefully balance token lockups with sufficient liquidity. While locking tokens can incentivize holding and stability, too much lockup can lead to illiquid markets, especially during periods of stress. Projects should aim for models that encourage liquidity provision, rather than restricting it.

代币经济学模型必须仔细平衡代币锁定与充足的流动性。虽然锁定代币可以激励持有和稳定，但过多的锁定可能会导致市场流动性不足，尤其是在压力时期。项目的目标应该是鼓励而非限制流动性供应的模型。

The Speculation Trap One of the most pervasive issues in failed tokenomics models is over-reliance on speculation. While speculation is a natural part of any market, tokenomics should be designed to reduce excessive speculation rather than fuel it.

投机陷阱 失败的代币经济模型中最普遍的问题之一是过度依赖投机。虽然投机是任何市场的自然组成部分，但代币经济学的设计应旨在减少过度投机而不是助长投机。

Projects like BitConnect, a Ponzi scheme disguised as a cryptocurrency, were entirely built on speculation, promising users guaranteed returns through a "trading bot" that never existed. By the time regulators shut down BitConnect in 2018, billions of dollars had vanished.

像 BitConnect 这样的项目，一种伪装成加密货币的庞氏骗局，完全建立在投机之上，承诺用户通过从未存在的“交易机器人”来保证回报。当监管机构于 2018 年关闭 BitConnect 时，数十亿美元已经消失。

The problem here was that BitConnect's tokenomics were designed not to create real value, but to feed speculative fervor. The project's high returns attracted massive investments, but there was no underlying economic activity to back those returns.

这里的问题是 BitConnect 的代币经济设计不是为了创造真正的价值，而是为了满足投机热情。该项目的高回报吸引了大量投资，但没有基础经济活动来支持这些回报。

This "pump-and-dump" mentality is something we've seen in several other projects, from OneCoin to the short-lived hype around SafeMoon.

我们在其他几个项目中也看到了这种“拉高抛售”的心态，从 OneCoin 到围绕 SafeMoon 的短暂炒作。

To avoid the speculation trap, projects need to ensure that their tokenomics models are tied to actual utility and value creation, not just speculative price movements. Tokens should have clear use cases within the ecosystem—whether for governance, access to services, or payments—rather than existing solely as instruments for speculation.

为了避免投机陷阱，项目需要确保其代币经济模型与实际效用和价值创造挂钩，而不仅仅是投机性价格变动。代币应该在生态系统内有明确的用例——无论是用于治理、服务访问还是支付——而不是仅仅作为投机工具而存在。

Over-Reliance on Algorithmic Stability Algorithmic stablecoins have long been an area of innovation, but they've also been a source of significant failure.

过度依赖算法稳定性算法稳定币长期以来一直是一个创新领域，但它们也是重大失败的根源。

Projects like Basis, which shut down in 2018, and Terra's UST in 2022, both attempted to create algorithmic mechanisms to maintain stability without sufficient collateral backing. The idea was that the protocol itself could adjust supply and demand to maintain a stable price.

Basis 于 2018 年关闭，Terra 的 UST 于 2022 年关闭，它们都试图创建算法机制来在没有足够抵押支持的情况下保持稳定性。这个想法是协议本身可以调整供需以维持稳定的价格。

However, these models often fail because they rely too heavily on market confidence and the assumption that demand for the token will remain high enough to support the algorithm. When confidence erodes, these systems are vulnerable to runs, as we saw with UST.

然而，这些模型经常失败，因为它们过于依赖市场信心以及对代币的需求将保持足够高以支持算法的假设。当信心减弱时，这些系统很容易出现挤兑，正如我们在 UST 中看到的那样。

Once the peg breaks, it becomes nearly impossible to restore, as the system floods the market with supply, driving down the token's value further.

一旦挂钩被打破，就几乎不可能恢复，因为系统会向市场供应大量供应，从而进一步压低代币的价值。

The lesson here is that algorithmic stability models are inherently fragile without sufficient collateral or external support mechanisms. While some projects, like MakerDAO's DAI, have successfully incorporated

这里的教训是，如果没有足够的抵押品或外部支持机制，算法稳定性模型本质上是脆弱的。虽然一些项目，例如 MakerDAO 的 DAI，已经成功地将