前中將塔里克汗最近寫了一篇關於反叛亂的短文，需要認真閱讀和討論。

在所謂的「反恐戰爭」期間，汗首先指揮了一個駐紮在德拉伊斯梅爾汗的師，其行動區域在南部

Former Lieutenant-General Tariq Khan has recently penned a short piece on counterinsurgency, which needs serious reading and discussion. A word about Khan before I get to the points he has raised.

前中將塔里克汗最近寫了一篇關於反叛亂的短文，需要認真閱讀和討論。在談到可汗提出的觀點之前，先簡單介紹一下他。

During the days of the so-called 'War on Terror,' Khan first commanded a division based in Dera Ismail Khan with its area of operations in South Waziristan and later took over as Inspector-General Frontier Corps. In both command capacities, he arguably garnered the most hands-on experience of any general officer in planning and executing small-, medium- and large-scale operations. His analysis, therefore, is guided by practical experience.

在所謂的「反恐戰爭」時期，汗首先指揮了一個駐紮在德拉伊斯梅爾汗的師，其行動區域位於南瓦濟里斯坦，後來接任邊境軍團監察長。在這兩種指揮身份中，他可以說在規劃和執行小、中、大規模行動方面獲得了所有將官中最豐富的實踐經驗。因此，他的分析是以實務經驗為指導的。

Later, as lieutenant-general he commanded 1 Corps, which is one of the two strike corps of Pakistan Army.

後來，作為中將，他指揮了巴基斯坦陸軍兩個突擊軍之一的第1軍。

Let me now proceed to the central points of his analysis under four heads: analysing the threat, strategic response, tactical response, and administrative response.

現在讓我從四個方面來談談他的分析的中心點：分析威脅、策略反應、戰術反應和行政反應。

[NB: the summary of Khan's points is in italics; my assessment is in plain text.]

[註：可汗的觀點摘要以斜體字顯示；我的評估是純文字的。

THE THREAT

威脅

The militant does not seek space primarily, though his tactics are designed to gradually expand his presence by reducing the state's/government's writ. He does this by seeking and attacking political and military targets. Once he manages to dilute the state's writ, he secures space which he can govern by raising revenue and dispensing justice. This cycle is repeated to enlarge the physical space. The state loses credibility, and the people in those spaces come to rely on the militant because of the state's absence or near-absence. The militant's approach is incremental and he targets government officials, security forces and, in some cases, mounts spectacular attacks to cause civilian casualties. Simultaneously, he attempts to dominate the lines of communication by using improvised explosive devices (IEDs), ambushing security forces' convoys and raiding bases and posts in the area.

武裝分子主要不是尋求空間，儘管他的策略旨在透過減少州/政府的令狀來逐漸擴大他的存在。他透過尋找和攻擊政治和軍事目標來做到這一點。一旦他設法淡化國家的令狀，他就可以透過增加收入和伸張正義來確保他可以統治的空間。重複這個循環以擴大物理空間。國家失去了信譽，而這些地區的人們因為國家的缺席或幾乎缺席而開始依賴激進分子。武裝份子的做法是漸進式的，他的目標是政府官員、安全部隊，在某些情況下，還會發動大規模攻擊，造成平民傷亡。同時，他試圖透過使用簡易爆炸裝置（IED）、伏擊安全部隊車隊以及襲擊該地區的基地和哨所來控制通訊線路。

This is a good overall assessment of the threat. We experienced it in the erstwhile Provincially and Federally Administered Tribal Areas, many of which were lost to elements of Al Qaeda and an alphabet soup of Pakistani and Central Asian groups.

這是對威脅的良好整體評估。我們在以前的省級和聯邦直轄部落地區經歷過這種情況，其中許多地區都被基地組織分子以及巴基斯坦和中亞團體的字母湯所迷失。

Every one of the points above can be further broken down for the purposes of strategic and tactical planning. At the core of the militant's strategy is to neutralise the state's asymmetric advantage and create his own. He takes advantage of a number of factors to make this strategy work — poor governance, distances, terrain, underdevelopment, kinship bonds, religious/sectarian or ethnic affinities, porous borders, sanctuaries in foreign but contiguous territories, enabling environment (sympathetic foreign government(s), funding, availability of weapons, covert ingress and egress points etc)

上述每一點都可以進一步細分，以便進行戰略和戰術規劃。激進分子策略的核心是消除國家的不對稱優勢並創造自己的優勢。他利用了許多因素來使這一戰略發揮作用——治理不善、距離、地形、欠發達、親屬關係、宗教/宗派或種族親和力、漏洞百出的邊界、外國但毗鄰領土上的庇護所、有利的環境（有同情心的外國政府（ s)、資金、武器的可用性、秘密入口和出口點等）

Khan is right in arguing that space is not the primary operational objective. But it is a desired development if the state and the people can be physically and psychologically impacted through a strategy of incremental, event-based violence. In a way it is akin to what in nuclear strategy is referred to as 'salami slicing'.

汗認為太空不是主要作戰目標是正確的。但如果國家和人民能夠透過漸進的、基於事件的暴力策略對身體和心理產生影響，那就是一個理想的發展。在某種程度上，它類似於核子戰略中所謂的「薩拉米切片」。

Another important implication of Khan's argument is the militant's reliance on a reactive strategy by the state/government. The militant acts; the government reacts. Result: events outpace military employments and deployments and the militant retains the initiative.

汗論點的另一個重要意涵是武裝份子對國家/政府的反應策略的依賴。激進行為；政府做出反應。結果：事態發展超過了軍事部署和部署，武裝分子保留了主動權。

Corollary: unless the state can wrest the initiative from the militant, it will be forced to react — i.e., defend when an attack comes and wait for the next attack to come. According to Khan, "we have no specific strategy for the phenomenon; nor have we hypothesised the threat."

推論：除非國家能夠從武裝分子手中奪取主動權，否則它將被迫做出反應——即在攻擊到來時進行防禦，並等待下一次攻擊的到來。汗表示，“我們沒有針對這種現象的具體策略；我們也沒有假設這種威脅。”

The problem with a reactive strategy or not hypothesising the threat should be obvious, not least because we have been through that experience at a very high cost. Allowing the militant to ingress incrementally and ultimately capture physical spaces then requires major operations that are necessarily disruptive of sociopolitical and economic life in those areas. A proactive strategy, on the other hand, takes the 'war' to the adversary and, in the initial phases, relies on the scalpel

反應策略或不假設威脅的問題應該是顯而易見的，尤其是因為我們已經以非常高的成本經歷了這種經歷。如果允許武裝分子逐步進入並最終佔領實體空間，就需要採取重大行動，這些行動必然會擾亂這些地區的社會政治和經濟生活。另一方面，主動戰略將「戰爭」引向對手，並在最初階段依靠手術刀

This is where Khan speaks of the three-tier response.

這就是汗談到三層應對措施的地方。

STRATEGIC RESPONSE

戰略因應

Most importantly, the state policy should be proactive and it must control physical spaces. These spaces should be identified and secured. Law enforcement and local intel must be integrated with the people of the area. Denying space to the militant is very important while hypothesising the threat is crucial for appreciating the militants' orientation. This would help prioritise targets, the protection they need and the response that can be made available. The assessment must also include multiple threat scenarios in order for resources to be judiciously allocated. The execution should be decentralised but the command centralised.

最重要的是，國家政策應該積極主動，必須控制實體空間。應識別並保護這些空間。執法部門和當地情報必須與該地區的人民結合。否認武裝分子的空間非常重要，而假設威脅對於理解武裝分子的方向至關重要。這將有助於優先考慮目標、他們所需的保護以及可以提供的回應。評估還必須包括多種威脅場景，以便明智地分配資源。執行應分散，但命令應集中。

The strategic response, as argued by Khan, is in line with the overall appreciation of the threat. If the militant's primary objective is to undermine the state's writ, and if the first-order effect of that strategy results in physical, psychological and socioeconomic dominance of spaces, then it stands to reason that the militant should be denied spaces. Extrapolating from this, it would be

正如汗所說，戰略反應符合對威脅的整體認知。如果武裝分子的主要目標是破壞國家令狀，並且如果該戰略的一階效應導致了身體、心理和社會經濟的空間主導地位，那麼武裝分子應該被剝奪空間，這是理所當然的。由此推斷，將是