前中将塔里克·汗最近写了一篇关于反叛乱的短文，需要认真阅读和讨论。

在所谓的“反恐战争”期间，汗首先指挥了一个驻扎在德拉伊斯梅尔汗的师，其行动区域在南部

Former Lieutenant-General Tariq Khan has recently penned a short piece on counterinsurgency, which needs serious reading and discussion. A word about Khan before I get to the points he has raised.

前中将塔里克·汗最近写了一篇关于反叛乱的短文，需要认真阅读和讨论。在谈到可汗提出的观点之前，先简单介绍一下他。

During the days of the so-called 'War on Terror,' Khan first commanded a division based in Dera Ismail Khan with its area of operations in South Waziristan and later took over as Inspector-General Frontier Corps. In both command capacities, he arguably garnered the most hands-on experience of any general officer in planning and executing small-, medium- and large-scale operations. His analysis, therefore, is guided by practical experience.

在所谓的“反恐战争”时期，汗首先指挥了一个驻扎在德拉伊斯梅尔汗的师，其行动区域位于南瓦济里斯坦，后来接任边境军团监察长。在这两种指挥身份中，他可以说在规划和执行小、中、大规模行动方面获得了所有将官中最丰富的实践经验。因此，他的分析是以实践经验为指导的。

Later, as lieutenant-general he commanded 1 Corps, which is one of the two strike corps of Pakistan Army.

后来，作为中将，他指挥了巴基斯坦陆军两个突击军之一的第1军。

Let me now proceed to the central points of his analysis under four heads: analysing the threat, strategic response, tactical response, and administrative response.

现在让我从四个方面来谈谈他的分析的中心点：分析威胁、战略反应、战术反应和行政反应。

[NB: the summary of Khan's points is in italics; my assessment is in plain text.]

[注意：可汗的观点摘要以斜体字显示；我的评估是纯文本的。]

THE THREAT

威胁

The militant does not seek space primarily, though his tactics are designed to gradually expand his presence by reducing the state's/government's writ. He does this by seeking and attacking political and military targets. Once he manages to dilute the state's writ, he secures space which he can govern by raising revenue and dispensing justice. This cycle is repeated to enlarge the physical space. The state loses credibility, and the people in those spaces come to rely on the militant because of the state's absence or near-absence. The militant's approach is incremental and he targets government officials, security forces and, in some cases, mounts spectacular attacks to cause civilian casualties. Simultaneously, he attempts to dominate the lines of communication by using improvised explosive devices (IEDs), ambushing security forces' convoys and raiding bases and posts in the area.

武装分子主要并不是寻求空间，尽管他的策略旨在通过减少州/政府的令状来逐渐扩大他的存在。他通过寻找和攻击政治和军事目标来做到这一点。一旦他设法淡化国家的令状，他就可以通过增加收入和伸张正义来确保他可以统治的空间。重复这个循环以扩大物理空间。国家失去了信誉，而这些地区的人们由于国家的缺席或几乎缺席而开始依赖激进分子。武装分子的做法是渐进式的，他的目标是政府官员、安全部队，在某些情况下，还会发动大规模袭击，造成平民伤亡。与此同时，他试图通过使用简易爆炸装置（IED）、伏击安全部队车队以及袭击该地区的基地和哨所来控制通讯线路。

This is a good overall assessment of the threat. We experienced it in the erstwhile Provincially and Federally Administered Tribal Areas, many of which were lost to elements of Al Qaeda and an alphabet soup of Pakistani and Central Asian groups.

这是对威胁的良好总体评估。我们在以前的省级和联邦直辖部落地区经历过这种情况，其中许多地区都被基地组织分子以及巴基斯坦和中亚团体的字母汤所迷失。

Every one of the points above can be further broken down for the purposes of strategic and tactical planning. At the core of the militant's strategy is to neutralise the state's asymmetric advantage and create his own. He takes advantage of a number of factors to make this strategy work — poor governance, distances, terrain, underdevelopment, kinship bonds, religious/sectarian or ethnic affinities, porous borders, sanctuaries in foreign but contiguous territories, enabling environment (sympathetic foreign government(s), funding, availability of weapons, covert ingress and egress points etc)

上述每一点都可以进一步细分，以便进行战略和战术规划。激进分子战略的核心是消除国家的不对称优势并创造自己的优势。他利用了许多因素来使这一战略发挥作用——治理不善、距离、地形、欠发达、亲属关系、宗教/宗派或种族亲和力、漏洞百出的边界、外国但毗邻领土上的庇护所、有利的环境（有同情心的外国政府（ s)、资金、武器的可用性、隐蔽的出入点等）

Khan is right in arguing that space is not the primary operational objective. But it is a desired development if the state and the people can be physically and psychologically impacted through a strategy of incremental, event-based violence. In a way it is akin to what in nuclear strategy is referred to as 'salami slicing'.

汗认为太空不是主要作战目标是正确的。但如果国家和人民能够通过渐进的、基于事件的暴力策略对身体和心理产生影响，那就是一个理想的发展。在某种程度上，它类似于核战略中所谓的“萨拉米切片”。

Another important implication of Khan's argument is the militant's reliance on a reactive strategy by the state/government. The militant acts; the government reacts. Result: events outpace military employments and deployments and the militant retains the initiative.

汗论点的另一个重要含义是武装分子对国家/政府的反应战略的依赖。激进行为；政府做出反应。结果：事态发展超过了军事部署和部署，武装分子保留了主动权。

Corollary: unless the state can wrest the initiative from the militant, it will be forced to react — i.e., defend when an attack comes and wait for the next attack to come. According to Khan, "we have no specific strategy for the phenomenon; nor have we hypothesised the threat."

推论：除非国家能够从武装分子手中夺取主动权，否则它将被迫做出反应——即在攻击到来时进行防御，并等待下一次攻击的到来。汗表示，“我们没有针对这种现象的具体策略；我们也没有假设这种威胁。”

The problem with a reactive strategy or not hypothesising the threat should be obvious, not least because we have been through that experience at a very high cost. Allowing the militant to ingress incrementally and ultimately capture physical spaces then requires major operations that are necessarily disruptive of sociopolitical and economic life in those areas. A proactive strategy, on the other hand, takes the 'war' to the adversary and, in the initial phases, relies on the scalpel

反应策略或不假设威胁的问题应该是显而易见的，尤其是因为我们已经以非常高的成本经历了这种经历。如果允许武装分子逐步进入并最终占领物理空间，就需要采取重大行动，这些行动必然会扰乱这些地区的社会政治和经济生活。另一方面，主动战略将“战争”引向对手，并在最初阶段依靠手术刀

This is where Khan speaks of the three-tier response.

这就是汗谈到三层应对措施的地方。

STRATEGIC RESPONSE

战略应对

Most importantly, the state policy should be proactive and it must control physical spaces. These spaces should be identified and secured. Law enforcement and local intel must be integrated with the people of the area. Denying space to the militant is very important while hypothesising the threat is crucial for appreciating the militants' orientation. This would help prioritise targets, the protection they need and the response that can be made available. The assessment must also include multiple threat scenarios in order for resources to be judiciously allocated. The execution should be decentralised but the command centralised.

最重要的是，国家政策应该积极主动，必须控制物理空间。应识别并保护这些空间。执法部门和当地情报必须与该地区的人民结合起来。否认武装分子的空间非常重要，而假设威胁对于理解武装分子的方向至关重要。这将有助于优先考虑目标、他们所需的保护以及可以提供的响应。评估还必须包括多种威胁场景，以便明智地分配资源。执行应当分散，但命令应当集中。

The strategic response, as argued by Khan, is in line with the overall appreciation of the threat. If the militant's primary objective is to undermine the state's writ, and if the first-order effect of that strategy results in physical, psychological and socioeconomic dominance of spaces, then it stands to reason that the militant should be denied spaces. Extrapolating from this, it would be

正如汗所说，战略反应符合对威胁的总体认识。如果武装分子的主要目标是破坏国家令状，并且如果该策略的一阶效应导致了身体、心理和社会经济的空间主导地位，那么武装分子应该被剥夺空间，这是理所当然的。由此推断，将是