与他们渴望破坏的银行一样，Stablecoin发行人拥有约70-90％的客户存款，投资于固定收益工具的投资组合

稳定的硬币发行人，例如他们渴望破坏的银行，大约有70-90％的客户存款投资于固定收益工具的投资组合

The article discusses the risks associated with stable coins and how they are not immune to the same issues that can affect traditional banks, despite operating in a different environment.

本文讨论了与稳定硬币相关的风险，以及它们如何不受影响传统银行的相同问题的影响，尽管在不同的环境中运营。

It highlights several key points:

它突出了几个关键点：

* Stable coin issuers, similar to banks, invest a large portion of client deposits in a portfolio of fixed-income instruments. This makes their earnings sensitive to changes in interest rates, inflation, foreign investors' sentiment, and AUM.

*与银行类似的稳定硬币发行人将大部分客户存款投资于固定收入工具的投资组合。这使得他们的收入对利率，通货膨胀，外国投资者的情绪和AUM的变化敏感。

* These sensitivities in the past led to the 1933 banking crisis, necessitating deposit insurance and the separation of deposit-taking and investment activities, as stipulated by the Glass–Steagall Banking Act of 1933.

*过去的这些敏感性导致了1933年的银行危机，需要存款保险和分离存款和投资活动，如1933年的《 Glass – Steagall Banking Act》所规定的那样。

* However, stable coin issuers, operating more like broker/dealers in the fintech space, are not subject to these regulations and therefore also not candidates for any deposit insurance.

*但是，稳定的硬币发行人，更像金融科技领域的经纪人/经销商，不受这些规定的约束，因此也不候选任何存款保险。

* The article further mentions that while often considered safe havens, bonds are also affected by factors like default risk and changes in issuer credit rating, as seen with Fitch's downgrade of the U.S.

*文章进一步提到，尽管经常被认为是安全避风港，但债券也受到违约风险和发行人信用评级变化的影响，如惠誉降级时所见

* It also notes instances of a 10-Year Treasury bond yield spike and the Global Bond Massacre of 1994 due to unexpected interest rate increases by the central bank to combat inflation.

*它还指出，由于中央银行意外的利率增加了打击通货膨胀的意外利率增加，因此有10年的国库债券收益率和1994年全球债券大屠杀的实例。

* Additionally, the recent placement of tariffs by President Trump could decrease demand for Treasuries and ultimately increase volatility in the bond market, impacting the stable coin issuers.

*此外，特朗普总统最近提出的关税可能会减少对国库的需求，并最终增加债券市场的波动，从而影响稳定的硬币发行人。

* In essence, default risk, economic policies, and investor sentiment drive the bond market and its volatility, which could negate the safe haven status of these instruments.

*本质上，违约风险，经济政策和投资者的情绪推动了债券市场及其波动，这可能否定这些工具的避风港状况。

* Bank runs can easily occur if new deposits fail to outstrip withdrawals, necessitating short-notice bond sales on secondary markets to crystallize losses.

*如果新的存款未能超过提款，则很容易发生银行运行，因此需要在二级市场上进行简短的债券销售以使损失结晶。

* If these sell-offs drive down AUM below the minimum required for the company to remain viable, the company will become bankrupt.

*如果这些抛售将AUM降低到公司保持可行所需的最低限度，则该公司将破产。

* The FDIC has successfully managed to fully reimburse depositors, even those with balances above the $250,000 limit, in the recent failures of five banks with a total of $548 billion in assets.

* FDIC已成功地偿还了储户，即使是余额高于250,000美元限额的存款人，在最近的五家银行失败的情况下，资产总计为5.48亿美元。

* However, on the other side, about $85 million of client deposits are yet to be accounted for by Synapse's Trustee, and the Terra/Luna crash saw the UST stable coin de-peg from the dollar, evaporating nearly $40 billion in value.

*然而，另一方面，Synapse的受托人尚未将约8500万美元的客户存款负责，而Terra/Luna Crash的销售价则使UST Stable Coin De-Peg从美元上蒸发量，价值近400亿美元。

In essence, stable coins, like the weakest bonds in their portfolio and their AUM, are fragile. Being deployed in a public blockchain does not grant them immunity to the same risks faced by conventional banks, as they follow a similar investment playbook.

从本质上讲，稳定的硬币，就像其投资组合中最弱的纽带和AUM一样脆弱。被部署在公共区块链中并不能赋予他们对传统银行所面临的相同风险的免疫力，因为他们遵循类似的投资剧本。

The article concludes by mentioning that while some of the larger stable coin issuers are reporting record revenue numbers due to the current high-interest rate environment and high demand from investors for treasuries, this could change. If interest rates rise too quickly, governments might default and the bond markets could collapse, dragging stable coin issuers down with them. Conversely, if interest rates are decreased, stable coin issuers might face an unsustainable lower return on their investments or be forced to change their investment strategies to riskier longer-term T-bonds, a move that ultimately led to Silicon Valley Bank's downfall. Whichever way it goes, the reader is advised to beware.

本文得出的结论是，尽管一些较大的稳定硬币发行人正在报告创纪录的收入数量，这是由于当前的高利率环境和投资者对国债的高需求，但这种情况可能会发生变化。如果利率提高太快，政府可能会违约，债券市场可能会崩溃，将稳定的硬币发行人与他们拖延。相反，如果利率降低，稳定的硬币发行人可能会面临不可持续的投资回报率，或者被迫将其投资策略更改为更风险的长期t-bonds，这一举动最终导致了硅谷银行的倒台。无论采用哪种方式，都建议读者提防。