與他們渴望破壞的銀行一樣，Stablecoin發行人擁有約70-90％的客戶存款，投資於固定收益工具的投資組合

穩定的硬幣發行人，例如他們渴望破壞的銀行，大約有70-90％的客戶存款投資於固定收益工具的投資組合

The article discusses the risks associated with stable coins and how they are not immune to the same issues that can affect traditional banks, despite operating in a different environment.

本文討論了與穩定硬幣相關的風險，以及它們如何不受影響傳統銀行的相同問題的影響，儘管在不同的環境中運營。

It highlights several key points:

它突出了幾個關鍵點：

* Stable coin issuers, similar to banks, invest a large portion of client deposits in a portfolio of fixed-income instruments. This makes their earnings sensitive to changes in interest rates, inflation, foreign investors' sentiment, and AUM.

*與銀行類似的穩定硬幣發行人將大部分客戶存款投資於固定收入工具的投資組合。這使得他們的收入對利率，通貨膨脹，外國投資者的情緒和AUM的變化敏感。

* These sensitivities in the past led to the 1933 banking crisis, necessitating deposit insurance and the separation of deposit-taking and investment activities, as stipulated by the Glass–Steagall Banking Act of 1933.

*過去的這些敏感性導致了1933年的銀行危機，需要存款保險和分離存款和投資活動，如1933年的《 Glass – Steagall Banking Act》所規定的那樣。

* However, stable coin issuers, operating more like broker/dealers in the fintech space, are not subject to these regulations and therefore also not candidates for any deposit insurance.

*但是，穩定的硬幣發行人，更像金融科技領域的經紀人/經銷商，不受這些規定的約束，因此也不候選任何存款保險。

* The article further mentions that while often considered safe havens, bonds are also affected by factors like default risk and changes in issuer credit rating, as seen with Fitch's downgrade of the U.S.

*文章進一步提到，儘管經常被認為是安全避風港，但債券也受到違約風險和發行人信用評級變化的影響，如惠譽降級時所見

* It also notes instances of a 10-Year Treasury bond yield spike and the Global Bond Massacre of 1994 due to unexpected interest rate increases by the central bank to combat inflation.

*它還指出，由於中央銀行意外的利率增加了打擊通貨膨脹的意外利率增加，因此有10年的國庫債券收益率和1994年全球債券大屠殺的實例。

* Additionally, the recent placement of tariffs by President Trump could decrease demand for Treasuries and ultimately increase volatility in the bond market, impacting the stable coin issuers.

*此外，特朗普總統最近提出的關稅可能會減少對國庫的需求，並最終增加債券市場的波動，從而影響穩定的硬幣發行人。

* In essence, default risk, economic policies, and investor sentiment drive the bond market and its volatility, which could negate the safe haven status of these instruments.

*本質上，違約風險，經濟政策和投資者的情緒推動了債券市場及其波動，這可能否定這些工具的避風港狀況。

* Bank runs can easily occur if new deposits fail to outstrip withdrawals, necessitating short-notice bond sales on secondary markets to crystallize losses.

*如果新的存款未能超過提款，則很容易發生銀行運行，因此需要在二級市場上進行簡短的債券銷售以使損失結晶。

* If these sell-offs drive down AUM below the minimum required for the company to remain viable, the company will become bankrupt.

*如果這些拋售將AUM降低到公司保持可行所需的最低限度，則該公司將破產。

* The FDIC has successfully managed to fully reimburse depositors, even those with balances above the $250,000 limit, in the recent failures of five banks with a total of $548 billion in assets.

* FDIC已成功地償還了儲戶，即使是餘額高於250,000美元限額的存款人，在最近的五家銀行失敗的情況下，資產總計為5.48億美元。

* However, on the other side, about $85 million of client deposits are yet to be accounted for by Synapse's Trustee, and the Terra/Luna crash saw the UST stable coin de-peg from the dollar, evaporating nearly $40 billion in value.

*然而，另一方面，Synapse的受託人尚未將約8500萬美元的客戶存款負責，而Terra/Luna Crash的銷售價則使UST Stable Coin De-Peg從美元上蒸發量，價值近400億美元。

In essence, stable coins, like the weakest bonds in their portfolio and their AUM, are fragile. Being deployed in a public blockchain does not grant them immunity to the same risks faced by conventional banks, as they follow a similar investment playbook.

從本質上講，穩定的硬幣，就像其投資組合中最弱的紐帶和AUM一樣脆弱。被部署在公共區塊鏈中並不能賦予他們對傳統銀行所面臨的相同風險的免疫力，因為他們遵循類似的投資劇本。

The article concludes by mentioning that while some of the larger stable coin issuers are reporting record revenue numbers due to the current high-interest rate environment and high demand from investors for treasuries, this could change. If interest rates rise too quickly, governments might default and the bond markets could collapse, dragging stable coin issuers down with them. Conversely, if interest rates are decreased, stable coin issuers might face an unsustainable lower return on their investments or be forced to change their investment strategies to riskier longer-term T-bonds, a move that ultimately led to Silicon Valley Bank's downfall. Whichever way it goes, the reader is advised to beware.

本文得出的結論是，儘管一些較大的穩定硬幣發行人正在報告創紀錄的收入數量，這是由於當前的高利率環境和投資者對國債的高需求，但這種情況可能會發生變化。如果利率提高太快，政府可能會違約，債券市場可能會崩潰，將穩定的硬幣發行人與他們拖延。相反，如果利率降低，穩定的硬幣發行人可能會面臨不可持續的投資回報率，或者被迫將其投資策略更改為更風險的長期t-bonds，這一舉動最終導致了矽谷銀行的倒台。無論採用哪種方式，都建議讀者提防。