平民伤害减轻和响应：国防部新政策

美国国防部 (DoD) 最近发布了一项大胆的新政策，即题为“平民伤害减轻和响应”的国防部指令，旨在减少“下一个战场”中的平民伤害。

The Department of Defense (DoD) recently released a bold new policy, a DoD Instruction titled “Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response,” that aims to reduce civilian harm on “battlefield next.” This “scalable” policy, issued in December 2023, codifies best practices within the U.S. armed forces and standardizes them across the military services. While the United States has the most lethal and ethical fighting force in history, the policy acknowledges past battlefield failures. In doing so, it seeks to give renewed vigor to the wholesome adage—and one of my favorite sentiments—that “you don’t have to be sick to get better.” It also builds on international efforts to reach agreement on reducing harm to civilians.

美国国防部 (DoD) 最近发布了一项大胆的新政策，即题为“平民伤害减轻和响应”的国防部指令，旨在减少“下一个战场”中的平民伤害。这项“可扩展”政策于 2023 年 12 月发布，将美国武装部队内部的最佳实践编入法典，并将其标准化到各个军种。尽管美国拥有历史上最具杀伤力和道德的战斗力量，但该政策承认过去的战场失败。在此过程中，它试图为这句有益健康的格言——也是我最喜欢的观点之一——“你不必生病才能好起来”注入新的活力。它还建立在国际努力就减少对平民伤害达成协议的基础上。

Great Promise

伟大的承诺

The first rule on the battlefield is to kill only lawful targets. As readers of Articles of War know, the laws of war prohibit making civilians and civilian structures the object of attack. When attacking military targets, that same law requires commanders to weigh the potential civilian harm (typically referred to as “collateral damage”). The United States’ legal and moral obligation is to minimize civilian harm if possible while at the same time defeating a lethal foe.

战场上的第一条规则是只杀死合法目标。正如《战争条款》的读者所知，战争法禁止将平民和民用建筑作为攻击目标。在攻击军事目标时，同一法律要求指挥官权衡潜在的平民伤害（通常称为“附带损害”）。美国的法律和道义义务是尽可能减少平民伤害，同时击败致命敌人。

The law of armed conflict establishes a proportionality test that prohibits anticipated civilian harm that would be excessive to the expected military advantage of destroying the target. It is a subjective test based on the facts as the commander knows them at the time of the decision. The clearest expression of this customary law is contained in Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.

武装冲突法规定了相称性测试，禁止预期的平民伤害超过摧毁目标的预期军事优势。这是基于指挥官在做出决定时所了解的事实进行的主观测试。该习惯法最明确的表述载于《日内瓦公约第一附加议定书》第 51 条第(5)款(b)项。

The DoD’s new policy will—if carefully implemented—advance the United States’ efforts to make these decisions with greater fidelity to the spirit of the law and the facts on the ground. But the policy is not without risks. In particular, three cautions weigh heavy.

如果认真执行，国防部的新政策将推动美国更加忠实于法律精神和实际情况地做出这些决定。但该政策并非没有风险。尤其是三个警告很重要。

First, all stakeholders must recognize and persistently remind the world that the policy does not—by its own language—create new law. It is policy only. It does not in any way alter current legal obligations on the battlefield. Neither does it create binding customary international law.

首先，所有利益相关者必须认识到并不断提醒世界，该政策并没有（用它自己的语言来说）创造新的法律。这只是政策。它不会以任何方式改变当前战场上的法律义务。它也没有制定具有约束力的习惯国际法。

Second, leaders must assiduously avoid the very real risk that the policy will produce or perpetuate timidity, hesitancy, and worst of all for the soldier or commander, a culture of restraint and second-guessing on the battlefield. I have written about this “gap” and beat this drum in public remarks for a number of years because I have witnessed the impact of this self-imposed culture on warfighting.

其次，领导人必须努力避免非常现实的风险，即该政策将产生或延续胆怯、犹豫，对士兵或指挥官来说最糟糕的是，在战场上形成克制和事后猜测的文化。多年来，我一直在写关于这种“差距”的文章，并在公开言论中大肆宣扬这一观点，因为我亲眼目睹了这种自我强加的文化对战争的影响。

Third, the oft-repeated phrase “those bastards at division” looms large over implementation. Whether it’s a staff officer at the brigade level looking up at higher headquarters or a senior leader at the corps level looking down at subordinate headquarters, there is tension. Humans tend to think they’re correct, especially when they believe they are “closer” to the problem, have better information, and yes, are “smarter” than others around them. No matter the “common cause” or the professionalism of the players, these natural sentiments exist at all echelons. I’ve seen it. New players on the staff—like civilian harm mitigation (CHM) teams—will now be part of this tension between echelons, especially if connected to higher echelons by separate reporting chains.

第三，经常重复的短语“分裂中的那些混蛋”在实施中显得尤为突出。无论是旅级参谋仰望上级指挥部，还是军级高级领导俯视下级指挥部，都存在紧张感。人类倾向于认为自己是正确的，尤其是当他们相信自己“更接近”问题、拥有更好的信息，并且是的，比周围的其他人“更聪明”时。无论是“共同的事业”还是球员的职业精神，这些自然的情感存在于各个梯队。我见过。新的工作人员——例如平民伤害减轻（CHM）团队——现在将成为梯队之间紧张关系的一部分，特别是如果通过单独的报告链与更高梯队连接的话。

The most effective way to avoid these dangerous, culture-driven dangers is to recognize they can happen and train against them.

避免这些危险的、文化驱动的危险的最有效方法是认识到它们可能发生并针对它们进行训练。

I served as a practicing Army judge advocate for 34 years, including four combat deployments where I advised commanders at all echelons on the use of armed force. These included peacekeeping operations, armed conflict, and nation-building, the latter often mired in insurgency and pervasive terrorism. During these operations, the protection of civilians was always foremost in the minds of commanders.

我担任陆军军法检察官 34 年，其中包括四次战斗部署，为各级指挥官提供关于使用武装力量的建议。其中包括维持和平行动、武装冲突和国家建设，后者经常陷入叛乱和普遍的恐怖主义之中。在这些行动中，保护平民始终是指挥官心中的首要任务。

And, of course, U.S. armed forces have been the most engaged over the last 35 years around the world, beginning with Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The current plan is, therefore, well informed by American tactical and strategic experiences, from best practices in mitigation before a strike to best practices in response to strikes with civilian casualties.

当然，从“沙漠盾牌”/“沙漠风暴”行动开始，美国武装部队在过去 35 年里一直是全球参与程度最高的武装部队。因此，当前的计划充分借鉴了美国的战术和战略经验，从袭击前缓解的最佳做法到应对造成平民伤亡的袭击的最佳做法。

The policy is particularly well informed by the U.S. military’s experiences when things have gone horribly wrong. It is axiomatic that one seems to learn more—sadly, to be sure—from mistakes than from successes. This is no less true on the battlefield.

该政策尤其充分借鉴了美国军方在出现严重错误时的经验。不言而喻的是，人们似乎从错误中学到的东西比从成功中学到的东西更多——可悲的是，确实如此。在战场上也是如此。

Indulge me in a war story.

让我沉浸在战争故事中。

Mogadishu, Somalia. 1993. Somali militants ambushed and overwhelmed an engineer convoy. Concerned the battle captain was not providing fire support, the exceptional brigade commander circling overhead in his Blackhawk landed at our operations center, entering with the wind at his back. As he walked in, the radio crackled with “Grenade!” The convoy commander’s voice pierced the air. Everyone froze. No sound followed. A dud. The brigade commander immediately ordered the circling Blackhawks to fire, but before the staff could relay the

索马里摩加迪沙。 1993 年，索马里武装分子伏击并压垮了一支工兵车队。由于担心战斗队长没有提供火力支援，这位杰出的旅指挥官驾驶着他的黑鹰在头顶盘旋，降落在我们的作战中心，乘风进入。当他走进去时，收音机里响起了“手榴弹！”的声音。车队指挥官的声音划破空气。所有人都愣住了。随后就没有声音了。一个哑巴。旅长立即命令盘旋的黑鹰开火，但在参谋人员转发之前