平民傷害減輕與反應：國防部新政策

美國國防部 (DoD) 最近發布了一項大膽的新政策，即題為「平民傷害減輕和回應」的國防部指令，旨在減少「下一個戰場」中的平民傷害。

The Department of Defense (DoD) recently released a bold new policy, a DoD Instruction titled “Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response,” that aims to reduce civilian harm on “battlefield next.” This “scalable” policy, issued in December 2023, codifies best practices within the U.S. armed forces and standardizes them across the military services. While the United States has the most lethal and ethical fighting force in history, the policy acknowledges past battlefield failures. In doing so, it seeks to give renewed vigor to the wholesome adage—and one of my favorite sentiments—that “you don’t have to be sick to get better.” It also builds on international efforts to reach agreement on reducing harm to civilians.

美國國防部 (DoD) 最近發布了一項大膽的新政策，即題為「平民傷害減輕和回應」的國防部指令，旨在減少「下一個戰場」中的平民傷害。這項「可擴展」政策於 2023 年 12 月發布，將美國武裝部隊內部的最佳實踐編入法典，並將其標準化到各個軍種。儘管美國擁有歷史上最具殺傷力和道德的戰鬥力量，但該政策承認過去的戰場失敗。在這個過程中，它試圖為這句有益健康的格言——也是我最喜歡的觀點之一——「你不必生病才能好起來」注入新的活力。它還建立在國際努力就減少對平民傷害達成協議的基礎上。

Great Promise

偉大的承諾

The first rule on the battlefield is to kill only lawful targets. As readers of Articles of War know, the laws of war prohibit making civilians and civilian structures the object of attack. When attacking military targets, that same law requires commanders to weigh the potential civilian harm (typically referred to as “collateral damage”). The United States’ legal and moral obligation is to minimize civilian harm if possible while at the same time defeating a lethal foe.

戰場上的第一條規則是只殺死合法目標。正如《戰爭條款》的讀者所知，戰爭法禁止將平民和民用建築作為攻擊目標。在攻擊軍事目標時，同一法律要求指揮官權衡潛在的平民傷害（通常稱為「附帶損害」）。美國的法律和道德義務是盡可能減少平民傷害，同時擊敗致命敵人。

The law of armed conflict establishes a proportionality test that prohibits anticipated civilian harm that would be excessive to the expected military advantage of destroying the target. It is a subjective test based on the facts as the commander knows them at the time of the decision. The clearest expression of this customary law is contained in Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.

武裝衝突法規定了相稱性測試，禁止預期的平民傷害超過摧毀目標的預期軍事優勢。這是基於指揮官在做出決定時所了解的事實進行的主觀測試。該習慣法最明確的表述載於《日內瓦公約第一附加議定書》第 51 條第(5)款(b)項。

The DoD’s new policy will—if carefully implemented—advance the United States’ efforts to make these decisions with greater fidelity to the spirit of the law and the facts on the ground. But the policy is not without risks. In particular, three cautions weigh heavy.

如果認真執行，國防部的新政策將推動美國更忠實於法律精神和實際情況地做出這些決定。但該政策並非沒有風險。尤其是三個警告很重要。

First, all stakeholders must recognize and persistently remind the world that the policy does not—by its own language—create new law. It is policy only. It does not in any way alter current legal obligations on the battlefield. Neither does it create binding customary international law.

首先，所有利害關係人必須認識到並不斷提醒世界，該政策並沒有（用它自己的語言來說）創造新的法律。這只是政策。它不會以任何方式改變當前戰場上的法律義務。它也沒有製定具有約束力的習慣國際法。

Second, leaders must assiduously avoid the very real risk that the policy will produce or perpetuate timidity, hesitancy, and worst of all for the soldier or commander, a culture of restraint and second-guessing on the battlefield. I have written about this “gap” and beat this drum in public remarks for a number of years because I have witnessed the impact of this self-imposed culture on warfighting.

其次，領導者必須努力避免非常現實的風險，即政策將產生或延續膽怯、猶豫，對士兵或指揮官來說最糟糕的是，在戰場上形成克制和事後猜測的文化。多年來，我一直在寫關於這種「差距」的文章，並在公開言論中大肆宣揚這一觀點，因為我親眼目睹了這種自我強加的文化對戰爭的影響。

Third, the oft-repeated phrase “those bastards at division” looms large over implementation. Whether it’s a staff officer at the brigade level looking up at higher headquarters or a senior leader at the corps level looking down at subordinate headquarters, there is tension. Humans tend to think they’re correct, especially when they believe they are “closer” to the problem, have better information, and yes, are “smarter” than others around them. No matter the “common cause” or the professionalism of the players, these natural sentiments exist at all echelons. I’ve seen it. New players on the staff—like civilian harm mitigation (CHM) teams—will now be part of this tension between echelons, especially if connected to higher echelons by separate reporting chains.

第三，經常重複的短語「分裂中的那些混蛋」在實施中顯得尤為突出。無論是旅級參謀仰望上級指揮部，或是軍級高階領導俯視下級指揮部，都存在著緊張感。人類傾向於認為自己是正確的，尤其是當他們相信自己「更接近」問題、擁有更好的訊息，並且是的，比周圍的其他人「更聰明」時。無論是「共同的事業」還是球員的職業精神，這些自然的情感存在於各個梯隊。我見過。新的工作人員——例如平民傷害減輕（CHM）團隊——現在將成為梯隊之間緊張關係的一部分，特別是如果透過單獨的報告鏈與更高梯隊連接的話。

The most effective way to avoid these dangerous, culture-driven dangers is to recognize they can happen and train against them.

避免這些危險的、文化驅動的危險的最有效方法是認識到它們可能發生並針對它們進行訓練。

I served as a practicing Army judge advocate for 34 years, including four combat deployments where I advised commanders at all echelons on the use of armed force. These included peacekeeping operations, armed conflict, and nation-building, the latter often mired in insurgency and pervasive terrorism. During these operations, the protection of civilians was always foremost in the minds of commanders.

我擔任陸軍軍法檢察官 34 年，其中包括四次戰鬥部署，為各級指揮官提供關於使用武裝力量的建議。其中包括維持和平行動、武裝衝突和國家建設，後者經常陷入叛亂和普遍的恐怖主義。在這些行動中，保護平民始終是指揮官心中的首要任務。

And, of course, U.S. armed forces have been the most engaged over the last 35 years around the world, beginning with Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The current plan is, therefore, well informed by American tactical and strategic experiences, from best practices in mitigation before a strike to best practices in response to strikes with civilian casualties.

當然，從「沙漠之盾」/「沙漠風暴」行動開始，美國武裝部隊在過去 35 年裡一直是全球參與程度最高的武裝部隊。因此，目前的計劃充分借鑒了美國的戰術和戰略經驗，從襲擊前緩解的最佳做法到應對造成平民傷亡的襲擊的最佳做法。

The policy is particularly well informed by the U.S. military’s experiences when things have gone horribly wrong. It is axiomatic that one seems to learn more—sadly, to be sure—from mistakes than from successes. This is no less true on the battlefield.

該政策尤其充分借鑒了美國軍方在出現嚴重錯誤時的經驗。不言而喻的是，人們似乎從錯誤中學到的東西比從成功中學到的東西更多——可悲的是，確實如此。在戰場上也是如此。

Indulge me in a war story.

讓我沉浸在戰爭故事中。

Mogadishu, Somalia. 1993. Somali militants ambushed and overwhelmed an engineer convoy. Concerned the battle captain was not providing fire support, the exceptional brigade commander circling overhead in his Blackhawk landed at our operations center, entering with the wind at his back. As he walked in, the radio crackled with “Grenade!” The convoy commander’s voice pierced the air. Everyone froze. No sound followed. A dud. The brigade commander immediately ordered the circling Blackhawks to fire, but before the staff could relay the

索馬利亞摩加迪沙。 1993 年，索馬利亞武裝分子伏擊並壓垮了一支工兵車隊。由於擔心戰鬥隊長沒有提供火力支援，這位傑出的旅指揮官駕駛著他的黑鷹在頭頂盤旋，降落在我們的作戰中心，乘風進入。當他走進去時，收音機裡響起了「手榴彈！」的聲音。車隊指揮官的聲音劃破空氣。所有人都愣住了。隨後就沒有聲音了。一個啞巴。旅長立即命令盤旋的黑鷹開火，但在參謀人員轉發之前