雜種又回到了聚光燈下。 DEX本可以看到其流動性基金，其中包含用戶的資金，完全清空。

Bybit最近證明了。但是，在超流動性的情況下，HLP是一個弱點，因為它不斷暴露於市場操縱的嘗試。

Two weeks after being manipulated by an experienced trader, Hyperliquid is back in the spotlight. DEX could have seen its liquidity fund, containing users’ funds, completely emptied. However, the lack of decentralisation can sometimes prevent the worst.

在被經驗豐富的商人操縱後的兩個星期後，Hyproliquid又重新成為了人們的關注。 DEX本可以看到其流動性基金，其中包含用戶的資金，完全清空。但是，缺乏權力下放有時會阻止最壞情況。

The attack suffered by Hyperliquid

攻擊遭受了混血

Hyperliquid’s success, which can be verified by its daily trading volumes, is all the more remarkable considering that DEX is still a very young protocol. This makes it still relatively untested and thus an ideal prey for manipulation attempts by some malicious traders. Only a fortnight ago, the platform suffered a loss of $4 million as a result of a large-scale leveraged manipulation of $300 million on Ethereum. With an ingenious strategy, a trader managed to cash in his profits through leverage, leaving Hyperliquid to handle the liquidation. It was a manoeuvre that required a cool head and a deep understanding of liquidation processes, as well as the workings of DEX itself. The latter is based on the Hyperliquid Liquidity Pool (HLP), an internal, mutualised liquidity fund into which users can deposit funds and receive rewards from fees collected by the protocol. This fund provides liquidity to DEX traders when needed, ensuring the stability of trading operations and also acting as a ‘safety buffer’ in case of liquidavision. However, this mechanism represents both a strength and a weakness for the protocol.

考慮到DEX仍然是非常年輕的協議，Hyperliquid的成功可以通過其日常交易量來驗證。這使其仍然相對未經測試，因此是一些惡意交易者進行操縱嘗試的理想獵物。僅在兩週前，該平台由於對以太坊的3億美元槓桿操作而損失了400萬美元。通過巧妙的策略，交易員設法通過槓桿來兌現他的利潤，使超流利處理清算。這是一種機動，需要一個涼爽的頭部，並深入了解清算過程以及DEX本身的工作。後者是基於超級流動性池（HLP），這是一種內部的，共同化的流動性基金，用戶可以在該基金中存入資金並從協議收取的費用中獲得獎勵。該基金在需要時向DEX交易者提供流動性，確保交易業務的穩定性，並在LiquidAvision的情況下充當“安全緩衝區”。但是，這種機制既代表了協議的強度又代表了弱點。

How the JELLY token was manipulated

如何操縱果凍令牌

Having funds available to protect users is generally a good thing, as Bybit recently demonstrated. However, in the case of Hyperliquid, the HLP is a weak point, as it is constantly exposed to attempts at market manipulation. On the face of it, no one would have any interest in challenging the HLP, as this would imply being liquidated. However, with well-planned strategies, it is possible to generate high profits while leaving the cash fund to handle the losses. Here’s what happened: a single attacker deposited over $7 million into three separate Hyperliquid accounts within minutes to manipulate the low market capitalisation memecoin JELLY (around $10 million before the attack). In summary, through address 0xde95, the trader opened a massive short position on JELLY (400 million tokens, or 40% of the total supply), while simultaneously opening long positions on other addresses. The trader then manually reduced the margin, self-liquidating and leaving the liquidity fund (HLP) to cover the losses. As a result, the protocol ended up with a latent loss of USD 12 million, as the price of JELLY had reached USD 0.05 at its peak. Meanwhile, through the newly created address 0x20e8, the same trader made multimillion-dollar profits from JELLY’s price increase and long positions, cashing in between $8 and $10 million.

正如Bybit最近所證明的那樣，擁有可保護用戶的資金通常是一件好事。但是，在超流動性的情況下，HLP是一個弱點，因為它不斷暴露於市場操縱的嘗試。從表面上看，沒有人對挑戰HLP有任何興趣，因為這意味著要清算。但是，借助精心計劃的策略，可以在離開現金基金來處理損失的同時產生高利潤。發生的事情是：一名單一攻擊者在幾分鐘內將超過700萬美元存入了三個單獨的超流利帳戶中，以操縱低市值的紀念因果凍（襲擊發生前約1000萬美元）。總而言之，通過地址0xde95，交易員在果凍（4億代幣，佔總供應量的40％）上開設了一個巨大的短職位，同時在其他地址上開設了長位置。然後，交易者手動降低了利潤率，自我液化並離開流動性基金（HLP）以彌補損失。結果，該協議最終導致了1200萬美元的潛在損失，因為果凍的價格在其頂峰時達到了0.05美元。同時，通過新創建的地址0x20E8，同一交易員從果凍的價格上漲和長位上獲得了數百萬美元的利潤，賺取了8至1000萬美元的賺錢。

The objective of the manoeuvre was clear:

機動的目標很明確：

Hyperliquid’s reaction and the debate on decentralisation

超流動的反應和關於權力下放的爭論

Faced with the situation, Hyperliquid was forced to delist the JELLY token. If the price had risen further, the losses for HLP could have become critical. A relevant detail is that while HLP was more at risk, Binance and OKX both decided to list JELLY on their platforms. Gracy Chen, CEO of Bitget, even compared Hyperliquid to ‘FTX 2.0’, fuelling a Web3-style wave of panic. To limit HLP’s losses, Hyperliquid manually changed the price of its oracle on JELLY, lowering it from $0.05 to $0.0095. In doing so, DEX not only cancelled out HLP’s latent loss, but also posted a profit of $700,000. This decision triggered fierce criticism, with many questioning the true decentralisation of Hyperliquid. Indeed, the protocol was launched with an initial set of only four validators, later increased to sixteen, all selected directly by Hyperliquid.

面對這種情況，Hyproliquid被迫將果凍令牌脫穎而出。如果價格進一步上漲，那麼HLP的損失可能會變得至關重要。一個相關的細節是，儘管HLP面臨更大的風險，但Binance和OKX都決定在其平台上列出Jelly。 Bitget首席執行官Gracy Chen甚至將超流動性與“ FTX 2.0”進行了比較，從而加劇了Web3風格的恐慌浪潮。為了限制HLP的損失，Hypliquid手動將其在Jelly上的甲骨文價格更改為0.05美元降低到0.0095美元。在此過程中，DEX不僅取消了HLP的潛在損失，而且還取消了70萬美元的利潤。這一決定引發了激烈的批評，許多人質疑超流動的真正權力下放。實際上，該協議是使用只有四個驗證器的初始集合啟動的，後來增加到16個，全部由超流體直接選擇。

Hyperliquid responded by stating that, given its young age, the protocol aims at progressive decentralisation, both for governance and for the code, which is currently still partially closed to the public.

Hyperliquid的回應是指出，鑑於其年齡較小，該協議旨在用於治理和守則，目前仍向公眾部分關閉。

This episode raises broader questions about decentralised finance:

這一集提出了有關分散財務的更廣泛問題：