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加密货币新闻

以职业为中心的硬币:回顾性

2025/03/10 14:00

这篇文章是《小战争杂志》新系列中的第一篇文章,称为回顾。在本系列中,我们要求社区的作者提交

This essay is the first in a new series at Small Wars Journal called RETROSPECTIVES. In this series, we are asking authors from our community to submit articles that reflect on their own works from 10+ years ago. Ideally, these are essays that you published with us or articles that were frequently cited by SWJ as part of the discourse on small wars and irregular warfare. We ask that you reflect on your thesis with the power of hind-sight on a personal and professional level. For our inaugural article, our Editor-in-Chief, Ken Gleiman, is reflecting on the first article he ever published back in September of 2011.

这篇文章是《小战争杂志》新系列中的第一篇文章,称为回顾。在本系列中,我们要求社区的作者提交反思10多年前自己作品的文章。理想情况下,这些是您与我们一起发表的文章,或者经常被SWJ引用为小型战争和不规则战争的论述的一部分。我们要求您在个人和专业层面上以后视的力量来反思自己的论文。在我们的首发文章中,我们的主编肯·格里曼(Ken Gleiman)正在反思他在2011年9月发表的第一篇文章。

I published an essay in Small Wars Journal in 2011 that coined the phrase, “Career-centric COIN.” I was a Special Forces Major at the time and had just entered my second year at the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth. The essay was a sort of a Jerry Maguire moment in my career, or at least it felt that way for me. If you’re not familiar with the movie, there is one scene where the title character, played by Tom Cruise, is speaking to an audience of executives at a large sports management firm. He becomes visibly flustered and pours his heart out into a monograph that highlights everything that’s wrong with their industry, the firm he works for, and how to fix it. He then prints multiple copies and leaves one for every person in his company. Initially greeted with praise, McGuire is soon fired for his vision that goes against the grain.

我于2011年在《小战争杂志》上发表了一篇文章,该文章创造了“以职业为中心的硬币”一词。当时我是一名专业的专业,刚刚进入了莱文沃思堡的高级军事研究学院(SAMS)。这篇文章是我职业生涯中的杰里·马奎尔(Jerry Maguire)的一个时刻,或者至少对我来说是这种感觉。如果您不熟悉这部电影,那么在一个场景中,汤姆·克鲁斯(Tom Cruise)扮演的标题角色正在与一家大型体育管理公司的高管观众交谈。他显然感到慌张,并将自己的内心倾注到专着,该专着突出了他们的行业,他工作的公司以及如何解决的所有问题。然后,他打印了多个副本,并为公司中的每个人留下一个。最初受到赞誉,麦奎尔很快因与谷物的愿景而被解雇。

I did not get fired for my essay. I did receive some praise and attention, though not nearly as much as another Special Forces Major, Jim Gant, whose essay One Tribe at a Time made an undeniable impression across the national security community. While I admired (and still do!) Jim Gant, I didn’t think much of his piece which I called “Gant’s Rant.” Perhaps with a touch of jealousy, but I believed Gant put too much focus on tribal engagement. In retrospect, I think a bit more of it. It was personal, passionate, and very persuasive. My monograph and article were historical, analytical, and empirical. Despite the moderate praise I received for my very academic article, there was a patronizing dismissiveness from more than a few senior Army leaders who agreed with my arguments but cynically suggested that’s just the way it is. They would pat me on the head. Somehow, I was smart, yet stupid, for pointing out the scandal of the haphazard organization of the COIN campaign in Afghanistan that wasn’t optimized with centralized authority and decentralized execution. Gant got sent back to Afghanistan to do what he loved best—engage with tribes and raise Afghan Local Police. He then tragically spiraled. I was sent to Afghanistan to do plans for the special operations command and try to figure out how to sustain the Afghan Local Police program politically, logistically, and operationally.

我没有被我的论文解雇。我确实得到了一些赞美和关注,虽然不如另一位专业的专业吉姆·甘特(Jim Gant),他的一篇文章一次在国家安全社区中给人留下了不可否认的印象。当我钦佩(仍然这样做!)吉姆·甘特(Jim Gant)时,我对他所说的“甘特(Gant)咆哮”的作品并不多。也许有些嫉妒,但我相信Gant对部落的参与过多地关注。回想起来,我认为更多。这是个人,热情和非常有说服力的。我的专着和文章是历史,分析和经验。尽管我对自己的学术文章获得了温和的赞誉,但少数高级军队领导人的不屑一顾也令人赞叹不已,他们同意我的论点,但愤世嫉俗地建议这就是这样。他们会拍我的头。不知何故,我很聪明,但很愚蠢,因为他指出了阿富汗硬币运动的偶然组织的丑闻,该组织没有通过集中权威和分散的执行进行优化。甘特(Gant)被送回阿富汗,做他最喜欢的事情 - 与部落与阿富汗当地警察培养。然后,他可悲地螺旋式螺旋式。我被派往阿富汗为特殊行动司令部制定计划,并试图弄清楚如何在政治,逻辑和操作上维持阿富汗地方警察计划。

The Argument

论点

The central thesis of my essay was two-fold. First, the United States designed its counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan against all evidence of what might be considered best practice from both history and theory. Second, the United States justified its counterinsurgency design on secret and sometimes overt military service and bureaucratic interests, as well as on the interests of their leaders, and those of other civilian agencies. The evidence backing my thesis was everywhere—from the decisions made about doctrine, to staffing, tour length, talent management, and especially in chain of command and command-and-control relationships. The military had replaced unity of command with a thin veneer called “unity of effort” top to bottom.

我的论文的中心论点是两倍。首先,美国设计了在阿富汗的平叛运动,反对所有证据,表明历史和理论中可能被认为是最佳实践的证据。其次,美国在秘密,有时以及公开的兵役和官僚利益,以及其领导人的利益以及其他平民机构的利益方面辩护了其平叛设计。支持我论文的证据无处不在 - 从关于学说的决定,人员配备,巡回演出,人才管理,尤其是指挥和指挥与控制链的关系。军方用一个名为“努力统一”上到底部取代了指挥的统一。

The Journey

旅程

The essay was based on my master’s thesis (more of a book really) that I had written while attending Command and General Staff College (CGSC). The Organizational Imperative: Theory and History on Unity of Effort in Counterinsurgency Campaigns was no ordinary CGSC paper. I came to CGSC unwillingly. I already had a master’s degree. I had graduated from Georgetown University’s Public Policy Institute (now the McCourt School of Public Policy) several years before. I had two combat tours and numerous operational deployments, but it wasn’t enough. I was young and arrogant enough to believe that I didn’t need any additional directed education. I studied and read widely enough on my own and I had heard that CGSC was not very rigorous. But I was compelled to go to clear a hurdle for promotion; and so, I went.

这篇文章是基于我在参加指挥和一般参谋学院(CGSC)时写过的硕士论文(实际上是一本书)。组织的命令:在平叛运动中努力统一的理论和历史不是普通的CGSC论文。我不情愿地来到CGSC。我已经拥有硕士学位。几年前,我毕业于乔治敦大学的公共政策研究所(现在是麦考特公共政策学院)。我进行了两次战斗之旅和许多运营部署,但还不够。我还很年轻,很自大,以至于我不需要任何额外的定向教育。我自己学习和阅读足够广泛,听说CGSC并不是很严格。但是我不得不去清除晋升的障碍。所以,我去了。

I found the intellectual experience at CGSC wanting, despite some very committed professors. There was no challenge. It was easy to pass, hard to fail, and annoying to others if you excelled. At that time, academic excellence had no real impact on one’s career, assignments etc. Senior leaders who occasionally stopped by to address the student body openly belittled the curriculum routinely playing to audience of students by saying

尽管有一些非常坚定的教授,但我发现CGSC的智力经历想要。没有挑战。如果您表现出色,那很容易通过,难以失败和烦人。当时,卓越的学术卓越对自己的职业,任务等没有真正的影响。高级领导者偶尔会停下来以公开对待课程的学生通常会对学生的观众说话,以说明学生的职业。

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