Maga很可能為下一個金融危機奠定了基礎

例如，很難通過試圖殺死紐約的交通擁堵定價計劃來了解特朗普的利益，該計劃已經顯示出明顯的積極成果

The Biden administration is continuing to roll back financial regulations put in place after the 2008 crisis, a move that economists say could increase the risk of another financial crisis.

拜登政府在2008年危機後繼續制定金融法規，這一舉動說，經濟學家說，這一舉動可能會增加另一個金融危機的風險。

The administration has already taken several steps to weaken financial regulation, including rolling back the Volcker Rule, which limits banks’ ability to engage in risky proprietary trading, and proposing to ease capital requirements for large banks.

政府已經採取了多個步驟來削弱金融監管，包括撤銷沃爾克規則，該規則限制了銀行從事風險的專有交易的能力，並建議減輕大型銀行的資本要求。

Economists have long argued that financial institutions need to be regulated. Even Adam Smith, the father of capitalism, who witnessed the Panic of 1772, which hit Scotland, London and Amsterdam, argued for significant restrictions on banks.

經濟學家長期以來一直認為需要對金融機構進行監管。甚至亞當·史密斯（Adam Smith）也是資本主義之父，目睹了1772年的恐慌，襲擊了蘇格蘭，倫敦和阿姆斯特丹，也主張對銀行的重大限制。

The 21st-century financial system is, of course, far more complex than that of the 18th century, although there are some echoes. Notably, “stablecoins,” crypto tokens that can supposedly be redeemed at will for actual dollars, are a lot like the privately issued bank notes of the 18th and 19th centuries, which could supposedly be redeemed at will for gold and silver coins. The main difference is that while bank notes were clearly useful for legitimate business, cryptocurrencies still don’t seem to have any real use case other than money-laundering.

儘管有一些迴聲，但21世紀的金融體系當然比18世紀要復雜得多。值得注意的是，據說可以隨意以實際的美元兌換的“穩定幣”，就像18世紀和19世紀的私人發行的銀行票據一樣，據說可以隨意兌換金和銀幣。主要區別在於，儘管銀行票據對合法業務顯然有用，但除了洗錢外，加密貨幣似乎沒有其他任何用例。

Did I mention that Howard Lutnick is now the Commerce Secretary? Lutnick has had close financial ties to Tether, which Bloomberg describes as

我是否提到過霍華德·盧特尼克（Howard Lutnick）現在是商務部長？盧特尼克（Lutnick

the stablecoin used by drug traffickers, terrorists and scammers to move money around the world.

販毒者，恐怖分子和騙子使用的穩定幣將錢在世界各地轉移。

And crypto aside, the complexity of modern finance makes it even harder for both consumers and investors to assess banking risks, so we need effective financial regulation to avoid or at least limit financial crises.

除了加密貨幣之外，現代財務的複雜性使消費者和投資者都無法評估銀行風險更加困難，因此我們需要有效的金融監管來避免或至少限制金融危機。

Yet the Biden administration is moving to loosen if not eviscerate financial regulation. And it’s doing so at an especially dangerous time.

然而，拜頓政府即使不是不屈服的金融法規，也正在放鬆。它在一個特別危險的時刻這樣做。

In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis I, like many economists, became a fan of Hyman Minsky’s “financial instability hypothesis.”

在2008年金融危機之後，我像許多經濟學家一樣，成為海曼·明斯基（Hyman Minsky）的“金融不穩定假設”的粉絲。

At a time when many economists were arguing that financial markets are generally efficient in the sense that asset prices reflect the best information available, Minsky argued instead that they are driven by cycles of greed and fear.

在許多經濟學家爭辯說，金融市場通常是有效的，因為資產價格反映了最佳信息，明斯基認為他們是由貪婪和恐懼週期驅動的。

A Minsky cycle looks something like this:

明斯基週期看起來像這樣：

In the aftermath of a financial crisis, investors are well aware that markets can go down as well as up. They are cautious about taking risks, and especially about leveraging up — investing with borrowed money. And as a result of this caution, financial markets are calm with relatively few crises.

在金融危機之後，投資者非常意識到，市場可以下降和興起。他們對冒險，尤其是利用借錢的投資謹慎。由於這種謹慎，金融市場在危機相對較少的情況下保持鎮定。

Over time, however, memories of past disasters fade, in part because those who remember bad things retire or move on, replaced by younger traders who have never experienced a major crisis. This eventually produces markets in which prices seem to go in only one direction — up — and whoever is most willing to take leveraged risks wins. Even those who intellectually know better get sucked in because of FOMO: fear of missing out.

然而，隨著時間的流逝，對過去災難的回憶逐漸消失，部分原因是那些記得壞事退休或繼續前進的人取代了從未遇到過重大危機的年輕商人。最終，這產生了價格似乎只朝著一個方向朝著一個方向發展的市場，而誰最願意贏得槓桿風險獲勝。即使是那些在智力上知道的人也會因為FOMO而變得更加吸引人：害怕錯過。

This manic phase doesn’t just induce many people to take on risks they don’t understand. It also creates what the famed investor James Chanos calls a “golden age of fraud.” (I’ll be posting a long talk with Chanos this weekend.)

這個躁狂階段不僅誘使許多人承擔他們不了解的風險。它還創造了著名的投資者詹姆斯·瓦諾斯（James Chanos）所說的“欺詐黃金時代”。 （我將在本週末與Chanos發表長時間的談話。）

When it seems as if fortune favors the brave, con men or, sometimes, con women find it especially easy to attract suckers, especially if they can hang their promises on a narrative — say, the wonders of crypto or the limitless potential of AI.

當命運似乎有利於勇敢，騙子或有時騙子的女人覺得吸盤特別容易吸引人時，尤其是如果她們可以將諾言懸掛在敘事上 - 例如，加密貨幣的奇觀或AI的無限潛力。

The New York Times recently ran a heartbreaking story about how the president of a community-owned bank in Elkhart, Kansas fell for a crypto scam, destroying the bank and quite a few people’s life savings in the process. You can be sure that we’ll hear many more such stories once we reach the final stage of the cycle — the Minsky moment, when euphoria-driven asset price surges give way to fire sales as highly leveraged investors desperately try to raise cash.

《紐約時報》最近講述了一個令人心碎的故事，講述了堪薩斯州埃爾克哈特（Elkhart）的一家社區擁有的銀行的總統如何因加密騙局而跌倒，摧毀了銀行，並在此過程中為很多人節省了生命。您可以確定，一旦我們到達週期的最後階段，我們就會聽到更多此類故事- 明斯基的時刻，當欣快驅動的資產價格上漲時，由於高度槓桿化的投資者拼命試圖籌集現金，因此我們可以讓銷售銷售。

Where do regulators fit into all of this? They can’t completely eliminate the Minsky cycle, which is deeply rooted in human psychology. But they can dampen it and limit the damage when the Minsky moment arrives.

監管機構適合所有這些？他們不能完全消除敏捷週期，該週期根源於人類心理學。但是當明斯基時刻到達時，它們可以削弱它並限制損害。

Yale’s Gary Gorton has shown that the extensive financial regulations introduced in the 1930s produced a 50-year “quiet period” in which there were plenty of stock market ups and downs — notably the “go-go years” of the 1960s followed by the very depressed market of the 1970s — but there weren’t any serious banking crises.

耶魯大學的加里·戈頓（Gary Gorton）表明，1930年代提出的廣泛的金融法規產生了50年的“安靜時期”，其中有很多股票市場起伏- 尤其是1960年代的“ go-go go go go go go go go lo Years' 1970年代沮喪的市場 - 但沒有任何嚴重的銀行危機。

But politicians are subject to the same mood swings as investors, so they tend to push regulators to loosen up precisely when they should be trying to rein in irrational exuberance. The Fed, which is somewhat insulated from politics and has a relatively long institutional memory — which has traditionally seen its role as being to take away the punch bowl just as the party really gets going (the original quote isn’t quite that snappy, but never mind) — has historically been the

但是，政客與投資者的情緒波動相同，因此他們傾向於促使監管機構在應該試圖遏制非理性繁榮時精確放鬆。美聯儲在某種程度上脫離了政治，並具有相對較長的機構記憶 - 傳統上，它的作用是奪走拳頭碗，就像派對真正繼續前進一樣（原始報價並不是那麼活潑，但是沒關係） -從歷史上看