DTAO：好，壞和大聲笑子網

我一直對小說的kenomics感興趣。看到加密協議如何保持激勵措施，有時它們看起來很誘人，這總是令人著迷

Author: donn

作者：唐

Compiled by: TechFlow

編譯者：TechFlow

I’m always interested in novel tokenomics. It’s always fascinating to see how crypto protocols align incentives, and sometimes they look very tempting — until they inevitably fall apart. So when Bittensor launched its dynamic $TAO (dTAO) system on Valentine’s Day, I was immediately intrigued.

我一直對小說的kenomics感興趣。看到加密協議如何使激勵措施保持一致，有時它們看起來很誘人 - 直到它們不可避免地崩潰為止。因此，當Bittensor在情人節推出了動態$ TAO（DTAO）系統時，我立即引起了我的興趣。

The idea is simple: provide a new, more “fair” way to distribute TAO issuance between subnets.

這個想法很簡單：提供一種新的，更“公平的”方式來在子網之間分發TAO發行。

But just one month later, problems emerged. It turns out that seemingly perfect designs don’t always work as expected in a free market.

但是僅僅一個月後，出現了問題。事實證明，看似完美的設計並不總是在自由市場中正常工作。

How dTAO works

DTAO的工作原理

Here is a simplified review of how dTAO works:

這是對DTAO如何工作的簡化評論：

Each subnet has its own subnet token ($SN), which exists in the form of a native TAO-SN UniV2 type pool. Confusingly, although users are "staking" TAO in exchange for SN, this is actually no different from "exchanging" TAO for SN in terms of functionality. The only difference is that users cannot add liquidity to the liquidity pool or trade between subnet tokens directly (e.g. SN1 → SN2), but can use TAO as an intermediary (SN1 → TAO → SN2).

每個子網都有自己的子網令牌（$ sn），它以本機tao-sn Univ2型池的形式存在。令人困惑的是，儘管用戶正在“ Staking” Tao以換取SN，但實際上，這與在功能方面的“交換” TAO並沒有什麼不同。唯一的區別是，用戶無法直接向流動性池或子網令牌之間的交易添加流動性（例如SN1→SN2），但可以將TAO用作中介（SN1→TAO→SN2）。

The issuance of TAO is allocated in proportion to the price of the subnet SN token. To smooth price fluctuations or prevent price manipulation, the system uses a moving average price.

TAO的發行與子網SN令牌的價格成比例。為了平穩價格波動或防止價格操縱，系統使用了移動的平均價格。

The SN token itself also has a high issuance, with a supply cap of 21 million, similar to TAO and BTC. A portion of SN is allocated to the TAO-SN liquidity pool, and the rest is allocated to the stakeholders of the subnet (miners, validators, subnet owners). The amount of SN allocated to the TAO-SN pool is to balance the issuance of TAO in the pool, so that the price of SN (in TAO units) remains stable while increasing liquidity.

SN令牌本身也具有很高的發行，其供應上限為2100萬，類似於Tao和BTC。 SN的一部分分配給TAO-SN流動性池，其餘部分分配給子網的利益相關者（礦工，驗證者，子網所有者）。分配給TAO-SN池的SN的數量是平衡池中Tao的發行，以便SN（在TAO單位）的價格在增加流動性的同時保持穩定。

However, if the above calculation results show that the number of SNs required by the subnet exceeds the maximum issuance of SNs (based on the issuance curve of SNs), the issuance of SNs will be limited to the maximum value, and the price of SNs (in TAO units) will rise.

但是，如果上述計算結果表明子網要求的SN數量超過了SNS的最大發行（基於SNS的發行曲線），則SNS的發行將僅限於最大值，並且SNS的價格（在TAO單位）將上漲。

The core assumption of this mechanism is that subnets with higher market capitalization create more value for the Bittensor network, so they should receive more TAO issuance.

這種機制的核心假設是，具有較高市值的子網為Bittensor網絡創造了更多的價值，因此他們應該獲得更多的TAO發行。

However, the reality is that the highest priced tokens in the crypto market are often those with the most attention, hype, Ponzi characteristics, and marketing resources. This is why L1 public chains and memecoins usually have the highest relative valuations.

但是，現實是，加密貨幣市場價格最高的代幣通常是那些具有最大關注，炒作，龐氏騙局和營銷資源的標記。這就是為什麼L1公共連鎖店和成員通常具有最高的相對估值。

Although the starting point of the mechanism design is good, assuming that subnets that generate value by generating revenue will use part of the revenue to repurchase SN tokens, thereby pushing up prices and obtaining more TAO issuance, this idea is somewhat naive.

儘管機制設計的起點是好的，但假設通過產生收入產生價值的子網將利用部分收入來回購SN代幣，從而提高價格並獲得更多的Tao發行，那麼這個想法有些天真。

Subnets filled with meme coins and out-of-control token economics

子網充滿模因硬幣和失控的代幣經濟學

Prior to the launch of dTAO, I discussed with a number of crypto analysts the apparent flaws in the dTAO token economics — namely that higher market cap ≠ higher revenue or greater value creation.

在啟動DTAO之前，我與許多加密分析師討論了DTAO代幣經濟學中明顯的缺陷 - 即，更高的市值≠更高的收入或更高的價值創造。

But I didn’t expect that this theory would soon be verified in practice. The free market worked in a “beautiful” way.

但是我沒想到該理論很快就會在實踐中得到驗證。自由市場以“美麗”的方式運作。

Just before the upgrade, an anonymous person took over subnet 281 and turned it into a memecoin subnet called “TAO Accumulation Corporation” (“LOL Subnet” for short). This obviously has nothing to do with AI.

就在升級之前，一個匿名人士接管了子網281，並將其變成了一個名為“ Tao Accumulation Corporation”的Memecoin子網（簡稱“ LOL Subnet”）。這顯然與AI無關。

From the now deleted Github page:

從現在刪除的github頁面：

Miners do not need to run any code, and validators score them based on the number of subnet tokens they hold. The more tokens a miner holds, the higher the issuance they receive.

礦工不需要運行任何代碼，並且驗證者會根據其持有的子網令牌數量進行評分。礦工擁有的代幣越多，他們收到的發行就越高。

What actually happens is: speculators buy SN28 tokens → SN28 price rises → SN28 gets more TAO issuance → If the issuance limit of subnet tokens is exceeded, SN28 price continues to rise → SN token issuance is distributed proportionally to "miners" holding SN → People buy more SN to get more TAO → Price rises further → Ponzi cycle continues.

What actually happens is: speculators buy SN28 tokens → SN28 price rises → SN28 gets more TAO issuance → If the issuance limit of subnet tokens is exceeded, SN28 price continues to rise → SN token issuance is distributed proportionally to "miners" holding SN → People buy more SN to get more TAO → Price rises further → Ponzi cycle continues.

As a result, TAO issuance officially began to fund… memes! At one point, the SN28 subnet even became the seventh-largest subnet by market cap.

結果，道發行正式開始資助……模因！有一次，SN28子網甚至成為市值第七大子網。

But why did SN28 fail to take over Bittensor? Centralization saved the situation

但是，為什麼SN28無法接管Bittensor？集中化節省了情況

In just a few days, the Opentensor Foundation used its root stake to run custom validator code, which essentially incentivises people to sell SN28 tokens, causing their price to plummet 98% in a few hours.

在短短幾天內，Opentensor基金會使用其根股權來運行自定義驗證器代碼，這實際上激勵人們出售SN28代幣，導致其價格在幾個小時內下降98％。

SN28 subnet tokens plummet 98% following Opentensor Foundation action

SN28子網令牌墜落98％，opentensor基金會行動

Essentially, the Opentensor Foundation acts as a centralized entity that prevents the free market from exploiting the dTAO mechanism. This centralized intervention is currently possible because we are in a slow transition period from

從本質上講，OpenTensor基金會充當一個集中實體，可防止自由市場利用DTAO機制。目前，這種集中乾預是可能的，因為我們從