Uncovering Wash Trading and Market Manipulation in the Crypto Market

In this in-depth analysis, we will analyze the on-chain data of the NexFundAI cryptocurrency to identify wash trading patterns that may extend to other cryptocurrencies and question the liquidity of certain tokens.

Original authors: Dessislava Aubert, Anastasia Melachrinos

Original translation: Block unicorn

On October 9, 2024, three market makers—ZM Quant, CLS Global, and MyTrade—and their employees were accused of engaging in wash trading and collusion on behalf of the cryptocurrency company and its token NexFundAI. According to evidence collected by the FBI, a total of 18 individuals and entities face charges.

In this in-depth analysis, we will analyze the on-chain data of the NexFundAI cryptocurrency to identify wash trading patterns that may extend to other cryptocurrencies and question the liquidity of certain tokens. Additionally, we will explore other wash trading strategies in DeFi and how to identify illegal activities on centralized platforms.

Finally, we will examine price manipulation behaviors in the South Korean market, which blur the lines between market efficiency and manipulation.

FBI Identifies Wash Trading in Token Data

NexFundAI is a token issued in May 2024 by a company created by the FBI, aimed at exposing market manipulation in the crypto market. The accused companies engaged in algorithmic wash trading and other manipulative tactics on behalf of clients, typically on DeFi exchanges like Uniswap. These actions targeted newly issued or low-market-cap tokens, creating a false impression of an active market to attract real investors, ultimately driving up token prices and increasing their visibility.

The FBI's investigation yielded clear confessions, with involved parties detailing their operational steps and intentions. Some even explicitly stated, "This is how we market make on Uniswap." However, this case not only provides verbal evidence but also showcases the true nature of wash trading in DeFi through data, which we will analyze in depth.

To begin our exploration of the FBI's fraudulent token NexFundAI (Kaiko code: NEXF), we will first examine the token's on-chain transfer data. This data provides a complete path from the token's issuance, including all wallet and smart contract addresses holding these tokens.

The data shows that the token issuer transferred token funds into a market maker wallet, which then allocated the funds to dozens of other wallets, identified in the chart by deep blue clusters.

Subsequently, these funds were used for wash trading on the only secondary market created by the issuer—Uniswap—located at the center of the chart, which is the intersection point for almost all wallets receiving and/or transferring the token (from May to September 2024).

These findings further corroborate the information revealed by the FBI through undercover "sting" operations. The accused companies used multiple bots and hundreds of wallets for wash trading, raising no suspicion from investors trying to seize early opportunities.

To refine our analysis and confirm that certain wallet transfers were fraudulent, particularly those within the clusters, we recorded the date each wallet received its first transfer, observing the entire on-chain data and not just limited to NexFundAI token transfers. The data shows that among the 485 wallets in the sample, 148 wallets (or 28%) received funds in the same block as at least 5 other wallets.

For a token with such low visibility, the occurrence of this trading pattern is almost impossible. Therefore, it is reasonable to speculate that at least these 138 addresses are related to trading algorithms and may be used for wash trading.

To further confirm the wash trading involving this token, we analyzed the market data from its only existing secondary market. By aggregating the daily trading volume on the Uniswap market and comparing buy and sell volumes, we found a surprising symmetry between the two. This symmetry indicates that the market maker company hedged the total amount across all wallets participating in wash trading daily.

Upon a deeper look at individual transactions and coloring the trades by wallet address, we also found that certain addresses executed identical single transactions (same amount and timestamp) during a month of trading activity, indicating that these addresses employed wash trading strategies, which also suggests that these addresses are interconnected.

Further investigation revealed that by using Kaiko's Wallet Data solution, we discovered that these two addresses, although never directly interacting on-chain, were both funded by the same wallet address providing WETH: 0x4aa6a6231630ad13ef52c06de3d3d3850fafcd70. This wallet itself was funded through a smart contract from Railgun. According to information from Railgun's official site, "RAILGUN is a smart contract designed to provide privacy protection for crypto trading for professional traders and DeFi users." These findings suggest that these wallet addresses may be involved in activities that require concealment, such as market manipulation or even more serious situations.

DeFi Fraud Extends Beyond NexFundAI

Manipulative behaviors in DeFi are not limited to the FBI's investigation. Our data shows that among over 200,000 assets on Ethereum decentralized exchanges, many lack real utility and are controlled by a